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ABSTRACT 
 
DYNAMICITY AND PERFORMANCE IN ADAPTIVE ORGANIZATIONS 
Alessandro Marino 
Daniel A. Levinthal 
 
In this dissertation, I focus on the conceptualization and empirical investigation of 
organizational adaptation. Specifically, I intend to study how dynamic organizations 
evolve and under which conditions they successfully adapt to a changing environment. In 
essay 1 (with D. Levinthal), we develop a simulation model to clarify and explore some 
of the basic conceptual issues concerning the dynamics through which business practices 
locally adapt within an intra-organizational ecology of organizational level skills, 
knowledge, and capabilities subject to processes of mutation and selection. For essay 2 
(with A. Prencipe), we designed and conducted a field project by collecting qualitative 
data: a mix of archival data, interviews and ethnographic field notes. The main goal is to 
investigate how organizational adaptation plays out under the pressure of various 
institutional forces. Our findings illustrate that institutional forces generate selective 
 
 
 vii 
reactions within the ecology of existing organizational routines. Conversely, non-
institutional forces adapt to the existing behavioral forms following a two-way dynamic 
process. In essay 3, I developed an empirical research design based on a panel data 
analysis to investigate the role of dynamic capabilities in boosting adaptation 
performance. This work examines some of the fundamental contingencies that impact the 
relationship between dynamic capabilities and organizational performance. Specifically, 
although prior experience in product adaptation is considered as a key driver of superior 
performance, its value is found to be highly conditional on both the level of focal activity 
– a recent adaptation effort on specific activities – and the intensity of the environmental 
changes.  
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1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Three Faces Of Organizational Adaptation:  Selection, Variety, And Plasticity 
The question of organizational adaptation is one of the most central lines of 
inquiry within the management literature.  The reasons for this are quite fundamental.  
First, there is the argument emanating from Simon (1956) that in the presence of bounded 
rationality, search is a central mechanism by which intelligent action is identified.  
Second, organizations operate in environments that themselves are dynamic and, as a 
result, the problem of intelligent action is not something that can be resolved once and for 
all, but must be continually reconsidered.   
Building on these motivations, discussions of learning and adaptation have a long 
tradition (Argote, 1999; Argyris, 1982; Cyert & March, 1963; Hedberg, Bystrom, & 
Starbuck, 1976; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988; March & Olsen, 1979; March & 
Simon, 1958).  In recent years, a new line of inquiry under the label dynamic capabilities 
has been an important focus of attention with the strategy field (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).  While much of this work is situated as an extension of the 
resource view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), other strands take a process 
perspective and point to the importance of organizational mechanisms in linking and 
recombining activities within the organization as underlying a firm’s dynamic capabilities 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  Central to both variants of these discussions of dynamic 
capabilities is some notion of organizational plasticity, the capacity for an organization to 
transform its resource and market position to further the pursuit of competitive advantage 
in a possibly changing environment.   
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 An alternative perspective on organizational adaptation the draws on Campbell’s 
(1965) work points to the process of variation and selection within an organization 
(Aldrich, 1999; Burgelman, 1991). Critical to a selection based argument is the question 
of what constitutes the units of selection (Freeman, 1975).  Nelson and Winter (1982) 
provided a powerful answer to this question with their work on organizational routines 
and the link to routinized action patterns to the relatively stable heterogeneity in 
performance across firms.   However, work that closely examines the enactment and re-
enactment of routine based behaviors in practice, they noted a surprising degree of 
fluidity in what nominally constituted the same action pattern (Birnholtz, Cohen, & 
Hoch, 2007; Feldman, 2000).  plasticity and the selectability of underlying traits define a 
space of intense potential interplays that has been absent in discussions of the possible 
virtues of more or less fungible organizational practices.  For instance, Davis, Eisenhardt, 
and Bingham (2009) demonstrate the flexibility advantages of relative “simple” rules in 
dynamic environments.  However, these rules are specified a priori and not emergent 
from some process of variation and selection.1 If flexibility, or plasticity, possibly 
impedes the intelligent selection among more or less valuable stable traits, then a full 
treatment of the internal ecology of evolutionary dynamics of organizations makes 
consider this tension.   
This issue of the more or less intelligent selection among a set of rules that vary in 
their plasticity is intimately related to the issue of the reliable replication of routine 
                                                
1 It is important to note in this context that the Davis et al. (2009) model considers the organization as having a single 
rule.  Further, while possibly “simple” in that only a sub-set of elements in the rule are fixed, considerable intelligence 
is assumed in that these fixed rules in that it is assumed that the general orientation of the rule (proportion of 1’s and 
0’s in the string characterizing the rule) correspond to the characteristic of the ideal behavior in the given environment.   
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behavior emphasized by Nelson and Winter (1982) and elaborated by other scholars 
(Rivkin, 2001; Szulanski, 1996; Zollo & Winter, 2002).  The notion of a routine as 
having a quasi-genetic quality was critical in Nelson and Winter’s argumentation as that 
provided a conceptual frame by which one could understand the persistence of distinct 
firm capabilities across time, and across the demography of entry and exits into various 
job positions within the organization.  As Rivkin (2001) demonstrates, the more 
interconnected the set of behaviors the greater the risk of a less than faithful reproduction 
of those specific behaviors at a later time period.  In a similar spirit, Zollo and Winter 
(2002) point to the important role of codification of behavior.   
Thus, while plasticity has possible benefits in terms of the possibility of 
addressing particular and changed circumstances, it also entails possible costs in terms of 
reduced selectability of the underlying traits and less reliable action patterns.  Plasticity 
can be viewed a kind of minimal, 0th order, dynamic capability (Collis, 1994).  Clearly, in 
the absence of plasticity there is no possibility of changed behavior.  Certainly, the 
discussion of dynamic capabilities points to the capacity of some organizations to more 
effectively transform the resources and capabilities in response to and even in 
anticipation of possibly changed circumstances (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 
2007; Teece et al., 1997).  At the same time, scholars (cf., Helfat et al., 2007) have been 
careful to note that dynamic capabilities should not viewed in an axiomatic manner as 
leading to enhanced organizational performance. In this regard, it is important to note that 
variability in behavior is not simply a function of the plasticity of a given set of 
behaviors, but also in the variation in behaviors within the organization.  Most models of 
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organizational learning examine a path-dependent, reinforcement learning process of a 
single pattern of behavior (Lant & Mezias, 1992; Levinthal, 1997).  As suggested by the 
work of March (1991) and central to the arguments of Campbell (Baum & Singh, 1994; 
Campbell, 1965), variability within the organization is also a critical form of variation, a 
form that can only be addressed by structures and conceptualizations that allow for some 
process of intra-organizational selection among an intra-organizational population of 
behaviors.   
While only engaging in the question of dynamic capabilities in a highly stylized 
manner of considering actions that are more or less flexible, and in that sense dynamic, 
this dissertation intends to explore some of these tradeoffs, or implicit costs of flexibility.  
Further, viewing the organization as a complex, adaptive system points to the fact that it 
is the adaptability of the entity as a whole that is critical and that it can be problematic to 
isolate a particular behavior or capability and interpret the implications of the possible 
adaptability of this particular element for the organization as a whole.  Indeed, this 
contrast is a central finding in March’s (1991) model of exploration and exploitation.  
While fast learning enhances the performance of the individual actor, an organization 
composed of a population of fast learners yields lower overall organizational 
performance.  In this sense, it is important to recognize that our focus should not be on 
the question of what might constitute more or less dynamic capabilities per se, but to 
what might constitute the properties of more or less dynamic organizations.2   
                                                
2 Of course, at a higher level of analysis of organization populations, there is a separate question of the adaptiveness of 
economic systems and to which that is enhanced by adaptation and resource allocation at the level of individual 
organizations or by the rise and decline of organizational populations.   
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 As suggested by Figure 1, clearly elements of these ideas of intra-organizational 
selection, variation, and plasticity have been considered previously in the literature, 
though not always with these labels.  For instance, the socialization process modeled by 
March (1991) in terms of actors’ beliefs or culture by Carroll and Harrison (1993) 
effectively act as a selection process with certain beliefs and values reinforced and others 
diminished.  Selection also effectively is represented by the decision rule, or 
“temperature” in a bandit model (Posen & Levinthal, 2012) where the likelihood of 
choosing what appears to be the more high performing action is tuned to shift the 
organization from being relatively exploitive or exploratory in its behavior.  The variety 
present in the organization is importantly a function of its search behavior and whether 
relatively local or more distant options are considered (Levinthal, 1997; March & Simon, 
1958).  Variety may also be introduced in a less intentional manner via mutations 
(Bruderer & Singh, 1996; Davis et al., 2009).  This issue of plasticity, under a number of 
different labels, has been central in the consideration of the question of organizational 
adaptation.  Most commonly this has taken the form of the learning rate in a process of a 
reinforcement learning (Argote, 1999; Lave & March, 1975).  However, as Davis et al., 
(2007) show, the value of flexibility can be considered quite apart from a process of 
reinforcement learning.  As suggested above, while only capturing a facet of the notion of 
dynamic capabilities, certainly plasticity is an important, minimal element in that 
construct.       
 
Insert Figure 1.1 About Here 
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1.2 Dissertation Structure 
To engage the questions described in the prior section three essays that adopt 
heterogeneous research methodologies are developed according to the following 
structure.  
1.2.1 Interplays Between Variation/Selection and Plasticity 
Essay 1 provides a theoretical overview on the interplays between plasticity and 
variation/selection in shaping the evolutionary routines dynamics. Specifically, a highly 
stylized model that incorporates elements of intra-organizational selection among action 
patterns and the degree of plasticity of these action patterns is developed. As prior 
literature would suggest (Burns & Stalker, 1961), the model shows that in more dynamic 
environments a greater degree of plasticity enhances performance. However, even in 
rapidly changing settings, the level of plasticity associated with maximal organizational 
performance is relatively modest.  Further, in the context of relatively intense internal 
selection processes, performance is generally enhanced by lower levels of plasticity.  
 
1.2.2 Adaptation Under Institutional Forces 
Essay 2 focuses on the understanding of the adaptive dynamics that are activated 
when organizations operate under the pressure of institutional forces. In this sense, this 
chapter deals with the interplays among different selective sources (i.e. the institutional 
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environment and the internal routines reactions) and the tendency of organizational 
routines to become plastic by altering their state when exposed to institutional pressures. 
Institutional theorists have defined a clear conceptual framework to predict 
organizational evolution. Specifically, normative, mimetic and professional pressures 
contribute to isomorphism, i.e. the emergence of common organizational practices across 
firms operating in the same field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, while 
institutional theories predict that organizations operating in similar fields tend to adopt 
similar practices, numerous studies have highlighted how the organizational reactions to 
these adoptions are not identical. Nonetheless, we know little on the mechanics and 
reasons underlying this spectrum of particular forms of adaptations to similar institutional 
pressures that organizations undertake. To investigate these aspects,  a field study was 
conducted in a medium-sized firm and developed a grounded theoretical framework. 
Our finding suggest the existence of a relationship between nature of the external forces 
that the organization experiences and the adaptive mechanism thorough which existing 
routines interplay with the dynamic pressures. Specifically, when the force is primary 
driven by technical ecomonic reasons – the non-institutional type – dynamic and mutual 
adaptation with existing practices is likely to occur. Conversely, if the main goal 
underlying the initiative  is to gain legitimacy within the field, the organization will be 
forced to operate a selection either strongly in favor or against a substantial adoption of 
the practice while still complying with the institutional needs. As a consequence, there 
exists a plurality of firm specific sources of variability that define markedly idiosyncratic 
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organizational dynamics under the pressure of institutional forces, thus supporting in 
substance the existence of behavioral polymorphism. 
 
1.2.3 Variety, Plasticity and Firm Performance 
Finally, Essay 3 examines the relationship between plasticity, variety and firm 
performance – a key aspect for organizational adaptation. Examining the possibilities and 
constraints of organizational change in response to environmental change has been a 
central topic in the organizations and strategy literatures. In recent years, this interest in 
understanding the intra-organizational mechanisms of change has coalesced around the 
concept of dynamic capabilities (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece et al., 1997). The general line 
of inquiry is linked to the idea that the organization can develop capabilities specifically 
dedicated to adaptation. More precisely, these studies suggest that stable properties of 
organizations facilitate efforts at effective change, as distinct from firm differences in 
capabilities associated with current performance. 
In developing the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of dynamic 
capabilities, scholars have been careful to be agnostic as to the performance implications 
of dynamic capabilities, recognizing the dangers of making performance advantages of 
dynamic capabilities tautological (Helfat et al., 2007; Helfat & Winter, 2011). In 
particular, Helfat et al. (2007) suggest that the relationship between dynamic capabilities 
and performance is importantly contingent on factors associated with an organization’s 
external and internal environment. However, the possible contingencies associated with 
 
 
 9 
the role of dynamic capabilities have not been well-developed either theoretically or 
empirically. On the other hand, the emergent body of empirical studies on dynamic 
capabilities has not generally been so circumspect. While the work has had to address the 
challenges of severe measurements issues (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; Newbert, 2007), there 
seems to be a general consensus regarding the positive impact of dynamic capabilities on 
firm performance (Drnevich & Kriauciunas, 2011).  
The present work examines some of the fundamental contingencies that impact 
the relationship between dynamic capabilities and organizational performance.  This is 
done in the context of a focus on the dynamic capabilities specifically dedicated to 
adapting the characteristics of a firm’s products to a changing environment, which prior 
researches have considered as a central domain for the understanding of the underlying 
phenomenon (Helfat et al., 2007; Teece et al., 1997). 
A well-developed argument and finding in the literature on organization learning 
is the role of prior experience as an essential ingredient in capability development 
(Argote & Epple, 1990). Relatedly, a substantial consensus has developed within the 
literature on dynamic capabilities as to the key role that adaptation experience plays on 
the genesis and magnitude of dynamic capabilities (Barreto, 2010; Helfat et al., 2007; 
Winter, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002). However, scholars are beginning to turn their 
attention to the specific attributes of adaptation experience that impact a firm’s 
adaptability (Danneels, 2008; Eggers, 2012; King & Tucci, 2002). This work further 
extends this line of research by taking a different direction. While adaptation experience 
is considered in its general form, its impact is considered in conjunction with the 
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concurrent role played by what is termed as focal activity. Focal activity has two 
distinctive elements – focal in both a “temporal” and “spatial” sense. The former as it is 
not cumulative, as capabilities (and learning processes) are generally treated, but 
references a narrow band of recent adaptation activities. The latter as it is specific to the 
particular domain of activities that are subject to current change.  
While adaptation experience constitutes a general source of knowledge that can 
facilitate a firm’s future adaptation to changed circumstances, focal activity provides a 
twofold complementary support. First, it constitutes a form of maintenance of dynamic 
capabilities, which need to be activated to work timely and properly (Helfat et al., 2007). 
An organization may cumulate a considerable knowledge of adaptive processes. 
However, a lack of recent activation of specific adaptive processes may prevent their 
timely reactivation. In addition, focal activity stimulates the level of technical variety of 
an organization, i.e. the degree of heterogeneity in components, technologies, and more 
generally the set of technical elements related to a product’s design. Prior studies built 
around the Darwinian paradigm of variation-selection-retention (Campbell, 1982) have 
stressed the importance of heterogeneity within organizations by highlighting its crucial 
role in defining their evolutionary paths (Aldrich, 1999; Baum & Campbell, 1999) or 
favoring technological recombinations (Fleming, 2001; Kogut & Zander, 1993) or 
integrations (Brusoni, Prencipe, & Pavitt, 2001). Therefore, to fully define the effects 
generated by product adaptation experience to firm performance, one should consider the 
contextual level of focal activity. The same reconfiguration mechanisms of a certain 
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product generate quite different outputs depending on its recent exercise (Helfat et al., 
2007) and on the characteristics of the existing resource base (Bharadwaj, 2000).  
Further, the ultimate outcome of product adaptation process depends on the 
timing of change (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). In fact, the level of environmental dynamics 
existing at the time of change may largely alter the effectiveness of the adaptation effort 
(Drnevich & Kriauciunas, 2011; Helfat & Winter, 2011). Accordingly, while as per focal 
activity a set of more practiced capabilities and a broader array of reconfigurations may 
be useful with the presence of intense adaptive efforts, this may constitute a form of 
unnecessary exploration in periods of environmental stability (Ocasio, 1997). 
In sum, this Essay helps define under which conditions product dynamic 
capabilities lead to superior firm performance. In this regard, the key role of prior 
experience and the moderating effects of focal activity and the intensity of environmental 
changes are investigated in a unique thirty-year panel of data related to the Formula One 
racing industry. It is argued that focal activity is either a positive or negative moderator of 
the relationship between adaptation performance and firm performance depending on 
whether the level of environmental dynamism is high or low, respectively. The following 
section further develops the theoretical background for the arguments and specifies an 
explicit set of hypotheses. These hypotheses are then tested and the main results are 
discussed. 
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1.3 Figures 
 
Figure 1.1 The Three Faces of Organizational Adaptation 
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2 THE INTERNAL ECOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONAL ADAPTATION 
Daniel Levinthal and Alessandro Marino 
 
Organizations carry out a wide class of practices, some at a strategic level such as 
mergers and acquisitions which may shape the very boundaries of the firm, others at a 
project or business unit level such as the development of new products or entering new 
markets, and still others of a more tactical sort, such as carrying out particular policies 
and procedures. We use the term practices as they can embrace both the fixed, quasi-
genetic property ascribed to routine-based action and the possibly idiosyncratic 
behavioral expression of this “genetic” property.  The expression of some fixed, quasi-
genetic traits in a set of particular circumstances reflects both the accumulated wisdom 
from the prior history of experience, as well as a possible response to the particular 
circumstances the actor faces.   
While the genetic basis of these practices serves as a point of reference for future 
reproductions, their concrete implementation requires a mix of ad hoc and intentional 
configuration toward specific purposes in specific circumstances. In other words, we 
consider as root or genetic behaviors (or hereinafter genotype) the organizational 
elements in a form that are reproducible over time. This may be in the form of a “decision 
premise” (Simon, 1947), a “simple rule” (Davis et al., 2009), or an existing pattern of 
behavior (Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982).  Note that the formalization of 
the information associated with the organizational element is not a necessary condition of 
its genetic status. Consider the abstract representation of a managerial practice that the 
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organization intends to replicate – it will contain a set of roughly defined instructional 
elements, but these elements will lack precise formalization or reduction to practice. 
Indeed, in the early work of Nelson and Winter (1982) the notion of routine 
carried both the idea of a gene, an inheritable trait, and phenotype, the behavioral 
expression of that trait.  Once one separates the construct of gene and phenotype, it 
becomes quite natural to recognize the possibly unique expression of “routine” action.   
Organisms, even if they share identical genetic structure but are subject to distinct 
environmental circumstances (imagine a plant subject to different degrees of sunlight, 
water, etc.), will take on distinct phenotypic forms.  Adopting this perspective, we 
suggest that while organizations may inheritable traits or genes that pass from one 
“generation” to the next, such as genetic imprint does not deterministically characterize 
the organizational form or enacted behaviors.   
Furthermore, not only is there a directional influence from genotype to phenotype, 
but there is also a reverse causality from realized phenotype to selection influences on the 
set of surviving genotypes.  Consider the implications of this argument for the 
selectability of the genetic roots of routine behavior.  The quasi-genetic basis of routine 
behavior provides a starting point for a process of subsequent adaptation and learning.  
Given that it is the learned behavioral patterns that are the basis of selection processes, 
then genetic bases that offer more or less favorable starting points for a process of 
adaptation should be differentially selected for.  Thus, while the evolutionary process is 
not Lamarckian in that learned traits or patterns are not themselves inheritable, the 
learning dynamics importantly underlie the selection process.  Within the biology 
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literature, this mechanism is known as the Baldwin effect (Baldwin, 1896) and refers to 
the capacity of organisms to genetically assimilate across generations traits that prove to 
be more effective in forming the basis for fitter phenotypes.   
This contrast between gene and phenotype is also helpful in conceptualizing what 
constitutes the plasticity of organizations.  In this context, plasticity relates to the 
adaptation and change of a particular attribute of a behavior pattern.  As typically 
conceived of in models of search and learning (cf., March, 1991; Levinthal, 1997), this is 
represented as a given attribute shifting from one value to another.  Thus, the classic 
process of reinforcement learning that has been the central mechanism considered in the 
literature on organizational adaptation (Argote, 1999; Levitt & March, 1988) is present at 
the phenotypic level in terms of expressed behavior. While minimal in this regard, this 
characterization of plasticity has the attractive analytic property that its value is not 
presumed.  That is, it is an open theoretical and empirical question as to whether varying 
degrees of plasticity are more or less valuable in enhancing organizational performance 
over time. 
 
An organization i is thus conceived of as a collection of genotypes, each representing 
a stable underlying basis of a set of practices.3 The number of distinct genotypes in each 
organization is indicated by W. An individual genotype w of the ith organization is coded 
                                                
3 The basic model structure, while novel to the organizations literature (though see Bruderer and Singh, 1996 and 
Davis, et al., 2009 for broadly related efforts), builds upon a substantial line of work in computational biology (Hinton 
and Nowlan, 1987; Holland, 1975; Mayley, 1996). 
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by a binary string of length N and is indicated by GEi(w) and the organization’s collection 
of genotypic elements by GEi(w) [w=1,…,W]. 
 
2.1.1 Phenotypic Plasticity 
From this starting point, a set of phenotypic forms is developed through a process 
of local adaptation.4 However, not all the bits of a given phenotype may be subject to 
such adaptive dynamics. At time 0, the parameter pl , ranging from 0 to 1, determines the 
probability that each bit of a genotypic string GEi(w) will be plastic or not during the 
process of phenotypic development. For those attributes which are specified as being 
non-plastic, the associated element of that genotype is treated as fixed. Therefore, its 
associated phenotype PEi(w) will be identical to the parent genotype over the process of 
local adaptation. Conversely, elements that are specified as being plastic will be subject 
to a process of local adaptation. The degree of plasticity pl is similar to the level of 
“simplicity” of decision rules in Davis et al., (2009), where a rule is more or less simple 
as a function of the degree of possible perturbation of its expression. At a minimal level, 
the phenotypic plasticity of the elements that compose the practices characterizes the 
capacity to adapt associated with a given practice. This specific form of plasticity relates 
to the adaptation of a particular attribute of a pattern of behavior.   
Specifically, from an initial setting of GEi(w) [w=1,…,W], each of the W 
associated phenotypes, indicated by PEi(w) [w=1,…,W], is obtained over time by 
                                                
4 We use the term phenotype to refer to the expression of an individual practice or routine and not to the organizational 
form as a whole. 
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performing a series of adaptation trials according to the mechanism described as follow. 
At the start of the adaptation process, a phenotype PEi,t(w) is generated by cloning the 
binary string representing the initial genotype GEi(w) (Mayley, 1996). Similar to 
Levinthal (1997), starting from this point, a new phenotype PEi,t+1(w) is obtained by 
flipping a single bit. Should the performance level obtained by the phenotype PEi,t+1(w) 
be greater than that associated with the prior phenotype PEi,t(w), then the change will be 
retained and the phenotype PEi,t+1(w) will constitute a starting point for a subsequent 
adaptation trial. Otherwise, the adaptation trial would fail and a new value of PEi,t(w) will 
be attempted at time t+1. 
 
2.1.2 Internal Selection Environment 
The series of adaptation trials continues until the organization carries out an 
internal selection event in which a new collection of practices is defined by respecifying 
a set of genotypic elements, call it GE´i(w) [w=1,…,W]. At each time step, the probability 
that an internal selection event occurs is equal to ps. Higher levels of this parameter 
define an internal selection environment characterized by a stronger, more aggressive 
internal selection environment.  
Internal selection occurs through differential replication of the existing set of 
genotypes GEi(w) [w=1,…,W]. While the phenotype may take on a possibly unique 
morphology, the assessment of the merit of the form will be attributed to the underlying 
genetic basis.  Thus, while the performance of the phenotype is the basis for the 
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differential selection among the set of behaviors, it is the genetic roots of that phenotype 
constituting the element that is effectively reinforced.  Holland (1975), building on the 
work of Samuel (1959), has referred to such processes as credit assignment mechanisms. 
Therefore, this selection process privileges genotypes associated with superior fitness as 
the basis for replication. More precisely, the choice of the genotypic elements of GEi(w) 
[w=1,…,W] to replicate in the new set GE´i(w) [w=1,…,W] is determined by a stochastic 
mechanism according to which the probability of being selected for a specific string, 
GEi(w), is proportional to the fitness of the associated phenotype (Holland, 1975), call it 
F(PEi(w)), obtained by the adaptation process at the time of the selection event (Mayley, 
1996; Suzuki & Arita, 2007). 
Given this calculation of phenotypic fitness, a proportionate selection rule is 
imposed based on the relative fitness of the various phenotypes (Holland, 1975; Wilson 
& Bossert, 1971). Accordingly, the probability of a given genotype of the old collection 
being replicated is equal to the expression: 
      (1) 
While it is standard in the literature on evolutionary biology (Holland, 1975; Wilson and 
Bossert, 1971) to treat selection as strictly proportional to fitness, in the context of a 
model of intra-organizational selection it seems appropriate to allow for more, or possibly 
less, stringent selection criteria. Indeed, the intensity of internal selection, the degree to 
which higher performing practices are privileged in the internal selection process, is 
F(PEi (w))SP
F(PEi (w))SP
W
∑
 
 
 19 
another important feature of the organizational context influencing the organization’s 
evolutionary dynamics. In sum, an internal selection environment is characterized by 
both tuning its frequency of renewal (ps) and its selection pressure (SP). Within this 
internal selection environment, the genetic elements that compose the most successful 
enacted practices diffuse at the level of the internal population (Warglien, 1995). Not 
only will these patterns of behavior diffuse, but the level of phenotypic plasticity itself 
changes as behaviors that are more or less plastic are selected for. Thus, the plasticity of 
the genetic elements constitutes in and of itself an inheritable trait of the practices. 
 The internal selection forces take various forms within the organizations. The 
policies for the diffusion of the best practices constitute a clarifying example. With the 
help of tools such as integrated databases and electronic knowledge sharing platforms, 
organizations attempt to systematize the diffusion of the most successful experiences 
within their boundaries (Hansen & Haas, 2001) and thereby change the demography of 
practices within the organization.  These activities are often classified under the larger 
category of knowledge management and constitute what is now a fairly common 
managerial practice. 
 
2.1.3 Practice Mutation 
Change in the demography of practices is driven by a number of forces.  First, as 
just noted, there is the differential selection within the organization over a set of 
practices.  Second, any given practice may take a distinct phenotypic form as a 
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consequence of its expression in a particular set of circumstances.  Third, there may be 
some drift or mutation in what we are terming the genetic roots of a given practice. 
Codified knowledge is not a static property of an organization (Zollo & Winter, 2002) 
whether through unintended mutation or more deliberate efforts at change.  With regard 
to the latter dimension, organizations display different levels of genotypic mutation 
depending on their tendency to experiment and generate novel genetic bases. As opposed 
to phenotypic plasticity, which captures the ability of the organization to adapt 
phenotypic forms based on their fitness with the external environment, these mutations 
operate directly on the gene and are not linked with the fitness of the associated 
phenotype. Accordingly, each bit of the newly generated genotypic string will mutate 
with a probability, pm.  
After each internal selection event takes place, a set of genotypic elements is 
specified and a new phase of phenotypic adaptation starts over following the same 
process described above. 
The adaptive process defined in the model is comprised of a hierarchical structure formed 
by the following two distinct elements: internal selection, which defines the evolution of 
the collection of genotypic elements and the overall level of phenotypic plasticity over 
time, and the phenotypic adaptation process in which the agents enact and refine a 
phenotypic form from a given genotype, occurring in the periods of time between internal 
selection events. The phenotypic elements comprise the ecology of practices that are 
activated, completed, and evaluated over time within the organization (Burgelman, 1994). 
Episodically these practices are evaluated via a process of internal selection that redefines 
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the organization’s population of genotypes. Subsequently, a new set of practices is 
generated and a new process of phenotypic development begins.  As a result, the 
evolution of the genotype follows a slower adaptive process, which is driven in an 
indirect fashion from the selection over the adaptive phenotypic forms, the set of 
organizational practices that have been developed. 
 
2.1.4 Performance Values 
The fitness of each phenotype N-tuple, F(PEi(w)), is evaluated in the standard 
manner of NK fitness landscapes (Kauffman, 1993; Levinthal, 1997), where N denotes 
the number of elements in the string and K the level of interdependencies across the N 
elements. More specifically, the fitness contribution value of a bit at a certain location 
depends on the value of bits in K other locations.  The contribution values associated with 
each possible combination of the bit’s value and the others that affect it are defined by a 
random number drawn from a uniform distribution [0,1]. The overall performance of a 
string is then the average of all the contribution values. When K equals zero, each 
element contributes independently to the overall fitness of the string, and the landscape is 
smooth, whereas when K=N-1, the fitness landscape is maximally rugged.   
NK fitness landscapes have been widely adopted in the field of computational 
biology to model the developmental mechanisms of phenotypic forms from underlying 
genotypes (see Suzuki and Arita (2007) and Mayley (1996) for representative examples). 
An alternative to this characterization of the payoff structure that might be used is a 
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single spike payoff as in Bruderer and Singh (1996) or a plateau as in Davis et al. (2009) 
where some subset of the payoff space receives a positive reward and other regions 
nothing.  The motivation for the use of NK structure in the current context is that it is 
consistent with a process of online learning where the evaluation of modifications of the 
phenotype is possible.  In contrast, in Bruderer and Singh (1996) and Davis et al (2009), 
trials are offline in that organizations do not experience the payoff of intermediate 
phenotypic forms and phenotypic level adaptation, absent selection processes, is not 
present.   
 
2.1.5 Summary of Focal Parameters 
In sum, in our analysis, we focus attention on the following focal parameters and 
contextual setting. The parameter pl reflects the capacity of the organization to 
dynamically adapt its set of practices by developing distinct phenotypic expressions of its 
genotypes. More formally, plasticity references the set of phenotypic elements that are 
candidates for possible adaptive trials. 
The second focal parameter, pm, refers to the tendency of an organization to 
randomly mutate its set of genotypes when an internal selection event occurs. All 
organizations start with the same initial condition in which half of the strings are 
homogenous, a randomly specified string is replicated W/2 times, and the remaining W/2 
strings are specified at random.  However, distinct settings are obtained by tuning the 
parameter pm.  
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A third pair of focal parameters characterized the frequency of renewal and the 
pressure of the internal selection environment. The former is defined by the parameter ps 
indicating the probability that at each step an internal selection event occurs. The latter, 
SP, refers to the exponent on the fitness value in the probability ratio determining the 
internal selection likelihood (see equation [1]). With respect to this parameter, it is 
standard in work on models of population ecology (Wilson & Bossert, 1971) and genetic 
algorithms (Holland, 1975) to treat selection as being strictly proportional to relative 
fitness (i.e., SP=1).  However, it is reasonable to postulate that organizations, acting with 
some conscious discrimination among populations of practices, may be more 
discriminating than a process of pure proportionate selection would suggest.  As a 
consequence, in our baseline setting, we take the fitness value for each phenotype, 
F(GEi(w)) in equation [1], to a power, SP equal to either 1 or 10 to capture organizations 
with low and high selection pressure, respectively. Moreover, we investigate the case in 
which no selection occurs according to which at each internal selection event a perfect 
replication of the prior collection of genotypes is cloned, regardless of the fitness values 
obtained by each of the related phenotypes. 
The configurations of organizations that emerge from the parameters illustrated 
above are analyzed at different levels of environment dynamism. Change in the 
environment is modeled as follows. At each step of the simulation, with probability equal 
to pc, the fitness level associated with each bit that constitutes a phenotype is respecified 
by drawing a new value from a uniform distribution [0,1]. 
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2.2 Analysis 
While we examine the robustness of the model to the full set of parameters, the 
analysis highlights the impact of differences across organizations with respect to the focal 
parameters outlined above. Central among them is the level of phenotypic plasticity.  We 
contrast the case in which organizations are inert (i.e. pl = 0) and a setting in which 
organizations are capable of phenotypic development at various magnitudes (pl = [0.25, 
0.5, 0.75, 1]. We also vary the tendency of the organizations to engage in a random 
genetic mutation, examining the range of pm  [0, 0.025, 0.05].  The internal selection 
environment is explored at two levels of renewal frequency, ps, [0.1 and 0.25] and the 
level of selective pressure in the internal selection environment is considered at a low 
(SP=1) and high level (SP=10). Moreover, we also consider the case of no selection 
according to which the prior set of genes is perfectly cloned at each internal selection 
event. Further, we explore these parameters under the two alternative environments: 
Stable (pc=0) and Dynamic (pc=0.05).  
Organizations are modeled as being composed of 20 genotypes (W=20). In the 
beginning of the simulation, each organization displays a common level of heterogeneity 
in genotypes, with on average 50% of the genotypic strings being the same and the 
remaining 50% independently randomly generated. For organizations that are not inert 
with respect to plasticity, each period during the adaptation process one of the plastic 
elements is chosen at random and a one bit change in this plastic element is evaluated.  If 
such a change improves phenotypic performance, it is adopted; otherwise, the existing 
phenotypic form is maintained.  
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The parameter ps is roughly calibrated and explored at two representative levels in 
the analyses reported here for the following reasons. The parameter ps is set so that the 
model operates as a hybrid between a pure genetic algorithm (Holland, 1975) and a 
typical “hill climbing” mechanism (Levinthal, 1997). Very frequent internal selection 
events (very high ps) cause the structure to operate more like a pure genetic algorithm in 
which selection operates directly on genes with little phenotypic developments. Indeed, 
in the limit, the genotypic strings would be not only “starting points” but they are also 
“final points” as no phenotypic development would occur. On the other hand, very low 
levels of ps characterize a setting of long periods of pure hill climbing mutations, 
resulting in a phenotypic search process that identifies a local peak in the fitness 
landscape and continues to remain there until, with the low probability ps, there is an 
internal selection event.  
The level of initial diversity in the genotype represents a  partial substitute for the 
focal parameter indicating the rate of random mutations in genotypes (pm). Indeed, both 
these parameters define the level of variety in the population of rigid genotypes. Given 
the tendency for some regression to the mean from any initial distribution of diversity, we 
focus on the parameter pm , which determines the ongoing rate of mutation, as a more 
controlled way to manipulate the level of genotypic diversity. 
In Table 1 a full set of experiments is reported.5 In this table, the average fitness 
values over 1000 simulation steps are reported. Further, the reported values refer to 
                                                
5 While the results presented here provide extensive analysis of this parameter space, given space limitations, a 
technical appendix is available from the authors that provides supplemental analyses examining the robustness of the 
results to the non-focal parameters. 
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averages over 100 independent runs. In addition to the set of parameters defined above 
the configurations reported in Figure 1 are replicated at three levels of complexity, K. In 
contrast to other analyses based on the NK framework (Ethiraj & Levinthal, 2004; Lenox, 
Rockart, & Lewin, 2010; Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2001; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003), the 
results are not terribly sensitive to the value of K. These other studies consider the 
organization as being composed of a single N-tuple.  In contrast, here the organization is 
comprises a set of W N-tuples that are subject to a process of differential selection as well 
as change at the level of the individual level of behavior.  As a result, the aggregate 
behavior is less subject to the pathology of being trapped the characteristics of a 
particular “starting point”. 
The trend defined by the intensity of mutation pm indicates that a moderate degree 
of genetic robustness is indeed functional to superior selection processes especially when 
plasticity is absent. Nonetheless, greater mutation magnitudes have neutral or negative 
marginal impact.  
To gain more insight on the role played by plasticity and selection, we set at K and 
pm at intermediate levels, K equal to 3 and pm equal to 0.025, and observed the average 
fitness levels. In Figure 2, these performance values are reported over a set of 100 
independent runs obtained by varying the random seed for each run of the simulation. 
Given this sample of 100 organizational histories, also reported in Figure 2 in addition to 
the mean value, is the 95% confidence interval level of the range of realized values.  
Insert Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 here 
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The results reported in Figure 2 clearly indicate that in stable settings plasticity 
and selection pressure are substitutes. In fact, when selection pressure is greater, higher 
plasticity is dysfunctional, whereas when selection pressure is lower or absent plasticity 
produces a beneficial effect. Moreover, if the frequency of renewal of the internal 
selection environment is greater this substitution effect is less symmetric and differential 
selection among relatively inert behaviors becomes the most effective mechanism of 
adaptation.  High levels of plasticity obscure the force of differential selection.  With 
frequent renewal/selection events, it is more effective for the behaviors remain inert and 
provide a stable and reliable basis for differential selection. In more dynamic 
environments, this main effect holds but tends to attenuate. Moreover, in this setting, a 
modest degree of plasticity is beneficial even in the presence of higher selection pressure 
especially if the renewal frequency is lower.  
In supplemental analyses, the focus was shifted to identifying the configurations 
with maximal performance. These results, summarized in Figure 3, highlight that even in 
rapidly changing settings the level of plasticity associated with maximal organizational 
performing configuration of parameters guiding the intra organizational evolutionary 
dynamicss require minimal plasticity when the environment is more dynamic, or full 
rigidity when the environment is stable.  Across a wide range of settings, a moderate 
tendency to mutate and maximal selection pressure are associated with maximal 
performance.  
Insert Figure 2.2 here 
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2.3 Figures 
Figure 2.1 Graphical Summary of The Simulation Results 
 
 
NOTES: The graphs report the averages performance over 100 independent runs. The 
vertical bars indicate the 95% confidence intervals. For each graph K=3, Random 
Mutation Probability = 0.025. On the x-axis prgressive numbers from 1 to 5 indicate 
levels of [0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1] of plasticity respectively.  
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Figure 2.2 Configuration of Maximal Performance 
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2.4 Tables 
Table 2.1 Simulation Results 
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3 ADAPTATION UNDER INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES 
Alessandro Marino and Andrea Prencipe 
 
One of the most important characterizations of institutional theory consists in the 
identification of a set of forces that could generate isomorphism across organizations: 
firms tend to adopt similar forms, procedures, and practices under the effect of a set of 
social forces (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The main characteristic of these institutional 
forces is in their underlying main goal: gaining legitimacy within a certain field whose 
boundaries tends to be socially defined. Legitimacy may be gained under coercive, 
normative, or mimetic forces (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Within this theoretical 
stream, a variety of empirical studies found that attaining legitimacy is connected with 
efficiency gains either temporally – e.g. Tobert and Zucker (1983) – or simultaneously – 
e.g. Kennedy and Fiss (2009). Echoing Tobert and Zucker (1983), Westphal et al. (1997) 
argued that whereas early adopters customize administrative innovations for efficiency 
gains, late adopters follow mimetic processes for legitimacy purposes. Using framing 
theory, Kennedy and Fiss (2009) extended this line of work and found that economic and 
legitimacy motivations co-exist and simultaneously inform adoption decisions. In other 
words, organizations will tend to converge in their forms because of their common 
membership in the field under the pressure of legitimacy and as a result of a cost-benefit 
strategic decision process.  
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On the other hand, a pure efficiency reasoning is in line with such research 
traditions as evolutionary economics and the capability-based view that maintain that 
upon the pressure of technical forces linked with goals of efficiency and productivity, 
organizations tend to develop polymorphism as opposed to isomorphism. Both 
evolutionary economists and supporters of the capability-based view maintain that 
organizations either develop or possess unique non-imitable traits that shape their form 
and influence their performance (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Several empirical accounts 
indeed showed that organizations may be able to achieve and maintain a sustainable 
competitive advantage – a fact that suggests the emergence of distinct morphologies as 
per their different ability to determine organizational performance (Dosi & Marengo, 
2000). Therefore, to date, the contrast between institutional theorists and strategists 
leaves an open theoretical question as to whether organizations that are exposed to strong 
pressures to gain both legitimacy and technical efficiency tend to develop in either 
isomorphic or polymorphic way.  
Indeed, further studies on institutional dynamics indicate a promising direction to 
solve this tension. In fact, whereas in its original formulation institutional theory refers to 
a generic tendency to adopt common practices within organizational fields, successive 
studies stressed that given a commonly adopted practice the actual organizational 
responses and subsequent related behavior may largely diverge across organizations. 
Ruef and Scott (1998) underlined the importance of defining a multidimensional 
approach to investigate diversity in legitimation processes. Similarly, Oliver (1991) 
stressed that organizations may generate alternative responses to institutional processes 
 
 
 33 
and identified a set of typical reactions that occur within organizations when a practice is 
introduced under institutional pressure. These reactions differ, ranging from a pure 
acquiescence to a defiance of the incoming practice. For the purpose of this study, it is 
important to stress that this variety in reactions to the introduction of a new practice is 
likely to shape very different behaviors associated with the same practice adopted by 
different organizations. Take two organizations that react very differently to the adoption 
of a code of conduct for corporate social responsibility. Organization A may absorb the 
code by proactively adjusting its internal behavioral norms to reflect the prescriptions 
reported in the code. Organization B may undertake avoidance mechanisms that disguise 
nonconformity but allow the organization to gain legitimacy in the field. In such a 
scenario, the isomorphic tendency occurs only at the level of the adopted practices, but 
not with respect to the actual organizational behavior. In sum, these studies have 
implicitly suggested that indeed what is similar across the organizations is the tendency 
to adopt a certain practice but not how the practice is then concretely executed by the 
organization – an argument certainly against the existence of behavioral isomorphism.  
Yet, while prior studies have defined a rich set of alternative organizational 
responses to similar institutional pressures, the underlying organizational mechanisms 
that generate such divergent responses have been left largely unexplored. Specifically, 
prior empirical studies that explored this misalignment provide little details on the 
dynamics that allow organization to absorb institutionalized practices. Westphal, Gulati 
and Shortell (1997) acknowledged the existence of a temporal gap between customization 
and conformity in regard of the adoption of TQM practices. They found an increasing 
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tendency to conform for late adopters in comparison with pioneers, which displayed 
greater customization. However, their measure of conformity provides little 
understanding on the actual behavior that is linked with the adoption of an 
institutionalized practice as it refers to the number of different sub-practices adopted by 
an organization with respect to the complete TQM package. Similarly, Lounsbury (2001) 
in his study on staffing variation in schools highlighted the existence of a relationship 
between institutional pressure and organizational practice focused on a very specific 
organizational area. In sum, the mechanisms through which organizations adopt and / or 
modify their routines in conjunction with external pressures is to date a largely 
unexplored issue. This aspect keeps the puzzle at the base of this work substantially 
unsolved. In fact, should these different patterns of organizational reactions be similar 
within fields then would isomorphism still occur not only at the level of practice adoption 
but also with respect to its actual behavioral execution. 
The purpose of this work is to solve this tension by bridging institutional theory 
with organizational accounts on structural and cognitive inertia.  Specifically, we 
maintain that to understand how institutional forces translate in actual organization 
behavior one has to investigate the adaptive dynamics that routines engage under these 
pressures to change. In fact, prior research (Nelson & Winter, 1982; other) has identified 
organizational routines as stable, idiosyncratic constraints that somewhat limit, or nullify, 
organizations’ ability to conform to adapt and would suggest an inability to respond to 
external institutional forces.  
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To investigate these issues, we designed and conducted a field study. Adopting a 
qualitative study approach in lieu of quantitative empirical design is particularly 
appropriate to conduct the present work. In fact, disentangling complex relationship as an 
important strength of a qualitative theory building approach. Dougherty (2002) suggests 
that “qualitative analysis characterizes [the] intricate webs [of causes, effects, processes 
and dynamics] so we can appreciate what a phenomenon is really like in practice, how it 
works and how it is affected by other patterns in the organization.” Specifically, we 
conducted an in-depth analysis of a single case study by focusing on a medium-sized 
chemical firm probing into conflicts between institutional pressures and routine 
persistence to explain the underlying mechanisms related to the adoption of Information 
and Technology-based systems (hereinafter IT) vs. quality certifications (herein also 
called TQM systems), such as ISO9000. It is important noting that these two initiatives 
drastically differ based on the role that the goal of legitimacy plays in each set of 
practices as the former (IT systems) are initiatives that have a somewhat limited impact 
on the firm’s level of legitimacy in the field whereas the latter are purposefully promoted 
for legitimacy reasons. More in general, we refer to pure institutional forces (hereinafter 
institutional forces) for which, regardless of the relevance of the technical reasons, the 
main driver of the practice adoption is associated with legitimacy reasons, and initiatives 
that are promoted for technical reasons and that have limited or absent legitimacy 
intention (labeled as non-institutional forces).  
We argue that this contrast is crucial to develop an in-depth understanding of the 
mechanism whereby routines evolve by jointly translating external forces into actual 
 
 
 36 
behavior. Following exposure to institutional forces, established routines tend to persist 
to the extent that organizational actors develop a parallel behavior that is specifically 
functional to comply with the institutional rules in order to achieve the goal of 
legitimacy. Oliver (1991) defined this behavior as concealing in that organizations de-
couple formal practices to comply with institutional forces from operational routines that 
keep informing actual organizational behavior. While our case study organization 
adopted the full ‘safety and security certification’– and indeed ultimately translated this 
into an operational routine, they concealed other certifications – they formally complied 
with them, but kept their previous operational routines alive. Simply put, the organization 
reacted to these forces by selecting in or out the proposed practice into the actual 
behavior. Conversely, we found that the non-institutional IT-based tools were smoothly 
adopted to the extent that they informed the development of new operational routines. 
Oliver (1991) defined this behavior as acquiescence.  
In sum, our main findings suggest that external pressures differ in their impact on the 
actual organizational behavior patterns – i.e. organizational routines – due to their 
inherent nature and, in particular whether these pressures are generated by what we 
termed as institutional or non-institutional forces. Our data reveal the mechanisms 
through which institutional and non-institutional forces stimulate either selective or 
plastic reactions of the existing organizational practices. More in general, the analysis of 
these emergent dynamics provides a general answer to our opening puzzle by supporting 
the existence of idiosyncratic firm-specific evolutionary outcomes across organizations 
exposed to similar institutional pressures.  
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3.1 Methods 
3.1.1 Research Design 
We use a case study because it combines multiple data sources to capture the 
interplay of diverse exogenous forces and organizational behavior (Yin, 1984). This 
research approach enables a detailed look at the dynamics at work in organizations 
undergoing change. Our research site, dubbed Alpha, is a world leading chemical 
manufacturer located in Italy. We chose Alpha as a “particularly revelatory” case 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Despite its dominant market position, Alpha’s 
dimensions are moderate with about 120 employees and USD 150mln of turnover. We 
purposefully selected such a context to facilitate understanding of the phenomenon of 
routines dynamics under institutional pressures and abstract its general traits. As Smets et 
al. (2012: 878) contend, “organizational properties are important phenomena that 
influence how individuals experience institutional pressures and condition how practice 
improvisations extend to the field level”. We posit that small and young firms as well as 
large ones are likely to be less suitable for this purpose.  The former setting may embody 
a latent and informal evolutionary environment activated by the stamina of the 
management/entrepreneur who strives on daily basis to promote an efficient diffusion of 
the emergent best practices. On the other hand, in a well-established, large firm, the most 
visible morphology of the internal dynamic environment will likely refer to pre-
determined and highly formalized knowledge management systems. In contrast, in a 
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medium-sized firm in a growth stage both these families of internal evolutionary 
mechanisms are likely to be equally visible and discernable. In fact, such firms tend to 
experience several intermediate situations while passing from an unstructured family of 
practices – typical of a young organization – to a structured system, which will generally 
tend to prevail over time. For these reasons, this type of organization is particularly 
suitable for this inquiry. In this regard, the maintenance manager stated: 
 
“Ours is an open system. It is not fully informal but we interact a lot and decide what to 
do. It is not fully structured as well. It’s intermediate. This is not a multinational firm or a 
firm where I worked in which everything was formalized or a firm with ten employees. 
We are just in between.” (Maintenance Manager). 
 
Moreover, while some technological innovation in Alpha’s production processes 
was introduced over the years, the main procedural blueprints have remained relatively 
stable. This aspect constitutes an interesting premise to investigate the evolution of 
behaviors under a moderately dynamic environmental setting with no major jolts that 
may alter the whole apparatus of patterned activities.  
 
“We have improved from a technological standpoint all the basic processes. Well, in 
their essence they remained the same, but the accessories have been continuously 
updated. For example, in our latest plant investment plan, although we adopted some US 
patents, we used them to develop our own technology. I am talking about the new 
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hydrofluoric acid generator, which is composed by a fluidized bed reactor. This is not 
comparable with a brand new reactor generated by any other engineering firm, as it is 
the output of our own cumulated incremental experience. With our experience, we put 
together a sort of Formula one car, a competitive one. (Maintenance Manager) 
 
3.1.2 Data Collection 
We drew upon three data sources – observation, personal interviews, and archival 
materials – to identify the firm’s organizational routines, capture their features, and assess 
their selective or adaptive changes in response to exogenous forces. To collect data, the 
first author spent approximately one month in our research site between May and 
September 2010. The data collection process was pursued in two major time blocks to 
allow reflections and refining of the study underlying research questions. 
While we focused on a single case study we developed a very deep knowledge on 
the existing intra-organizational dynamics. In fact, in the field, we had full access to the 
firm’s archives of documents and partial access to an electronic data room including a 
variety of the firm’s internal documentation such as presentations of completed projects, 
marketing materials, board meeting minutes, market analysis, etc. To facilitate access to 
this material, the top management gave instructions to an employee to help the first 
author search the database and extract the relevant sources. 
While in the field the researcher was allowed to join business meetings and take 
ethnographic notes on a daily basis. The meetings to which he had access were mainly 
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focused on sharing updates among the managers of different departments and were 
organized on a case-by-case basis with no specific pre-defined agenda.  
In addition, the researcher interviewed each manager of the firm with 
responsibilities to coordinate other workers, including the top management team. Overall, 
he conducted 41 personal interviews. Each interview lasted from a minimum of 30 to a 
maximum of 73 minutes and was structured as an open-ended conversation with a semi-
structured setup. All the interviews were tape-recorded using a cutting-edge technology 
that allowed the researcher to take “smart notes” while tape-recording the conversations. 
These notes have the feature that the researcher after the interview could listen to what 
the interviewee was saying while a specific passage of the notes was written by “tapping” 
electronic pen onto the special sheets of paper where the notes were taken. This technique 
has the interesting property that the notes are easily associable with each specific part of 
the conversation, thus allowing the researcher to reconstruct each part of the interviewing 
experience with precision.  
Subsequently, all the audio files of the interviews were transcribed to electronic 
files, in conjunction with the other notes and relevant archival material. Thanks to the 
various and rich material collected, we were able to rely on a broad set of data, which 
allowed multiple data triangulations. The two authors jointly discussed all the collected 
data. According to the Gioia methodology (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2012), one of the 
scholars acted as the “devil’s advocate”, openly challenging the validity of the other’s 
ideas. Facts and considerations were presented only when reaching a sound fit between 
the scholars’ collective interpretation and the external sources’ information. Specifically, 
 
 
 41 
once an agreement on the coding method was reached, the data were coded via an 
iterative method of subsequent analysis (Glaser, 2008). To code the data we used a 
dedicated software program that helped us generate detailed reports based on the 
subsequent coding layers. The coding iterations were defined as follows. In a first 
iteration, the first author coded the data based on macro themes to map the narrative 
dedicated to the aspects of dynamic evolution of organizational routines. Subsequently, a 
second wave of coding was conducted to understand the different angles of routines 
dynamicity under the pressure of institutional and non-institutional forces. Finally, a third 
round of codes refined the nature of the different categories and shaped the emergent 
dynamics.  
Our main interest was to describe the mechanisms responsible for the evolution of 
the organizational behavior when stimulated under the pressure of diverse exogenous 
forces. More precisely, our focus was on the evolution of the organizational dynamic 
mechanisms (i.e. the ways in which the organization modifies its routinized behaviors), 
under the force of two relevant exogenous changes, namely, the massive introduction of 
the IT systems and the adoption of the quality certifications.  
In this regard, during the interviews we managed to avoid retrospective call 
biases. In fact, our analysis relates to very recent events, due to the fact that both these 
exogenous forces were still highly active when the interviews were conducted, although 
they began operating in the firm at different periods of time. 
The next sections describe the findings linked with the qualitative data analysis. 
The quotes reported, translated in English from the text of the interviews originally 
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collected in Italian, are representative extrapolation of the coded material functional to 
the illustration of the related themes. 
 
3.2 The Case Study 
3.2.1 The Origins: Emergence and Dynamics of Organizational Routines 
In an initial stage of development, namely between the late sixties, when the firm 
was founded, and the early eighties the organization developed its routinized behavior 
from scratch. In fact, the first generation of workers and managers had relatively little 
experience in the chemical industry as many of them had worked in the mining sector or 
in other unrelated industrial segments. This feature was key to understand the dynamics 
of the initial development of the organizational routines. The heterogeneity of personal 
experiences across workers made the emergence of shared and common patterns of 
activities particularly complicated. Conversely, the emergence of dominant behavioral 
routines was based on the mutual experiential knowledge exchanges occurring in dyads 
or small groups that were repeatedly working on similar problems. As a result of this 
initial evolving process, the patterns of collective activities tended to cluster on several 
relatively small organizational units. 
 
“When I became manager, I had to adapt to my workers because they were ten and I was 
alone. I just wanted to keep following the directions of the top management and 
understand the workers at the same time. Everything went smoothly. Clearly, each of the 
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managers of the shifts had a personal method. These methods are now consolidated over 
the years and the managers can even hang out with the workers for dinner. But initially 
when Alpha moved its first steps things were much more complicated.” (Plant 
Purchasing Manager) 
 
The specific nature of these clustered routines was thus shaped based on the initial 
imprinting that each leader gave to the business unit for which she or he was responsible. 
Impressively, from the data, it emerged that over the years the map of these behavioral 
clusters has been extremely persistent. In other words, the various routines were 
preserved over time by a system of continuous mentoring across subsequent generations 
of leaders of each business unit, but among them it never emerged a clearly defined 
dominant form across business units.  
 
 “Keep in mind that many years ago when everything began, we had no mentors 
that could explain to us what to do and how to do it. We, the veterans, started up and we 
have learned all we know by ourselves. Now life is definitely easier as the more 
experienced people train the rookies. Now life is easier thanks to this mentorship system” 
(Plant Purchasing Manager) 
 
While the mentoring process has proved to function properly to transmit the 
established procedures and activities across leaders, it is interesting to note how the 
introduction of incremental innovations promoted by the leaders was not as fluid. The 
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managers found several obstacles to updating the transmitted routines as the workers built 
barriers to change with the purpose of minimizing their learning effort. As the plant 
manager stated: 
 
“I don’t like to impose orders to my employees, but you have to do what is needed in one 
way or another. You already have in mind what the goal is and you know what is the way 
to fulfill it. But people resist and you spend hours or days trying to convince to change 
their habits, thus losing a lot of time. Therefore, at a certain point to just impose a 
change and then explain why that was the best solution in retrospect. Of course 
sometimes I make mistakes. Perhaps, occasionally I have been to bossy by imposing a 
decision rather than creating consensus around that choice. The best scenario is when I 
am able to raise questions and doubts so that the workers come to the same conclusion 
and become more flexible.” (Plant Manager). 
 
In sum, the heterogeneous set of prior experiences that characterized the first 
generation of Alpha’s managers contributed to defining a multifaceted and clustered map 
of organizational routines, which were superordinate with respect to the formal 
organization. These behavioral forms were persistently transmitted though subsequent 
generations of leaders via a well-established mentoring system. At the same time, they 
became deeply ingrained in content and space as they showed rigidities both to the 
dynamic impulses induced by the leaders to update their structure and to “cross-border” 
diffusion across business units. 
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Nonetheless, unlike the minor dynamic impulses individually promoted by the 
managers, more pervasive and intense forces activated by the top management resulted in 
reflection and revision on the structure of the consolidated clusters of practices. We focus 
on two major interventions:  One is the massive diffusion of the IT systems that begun 
during the nineties and the second the quest for the standard certifications during the last 
decade. While both these set of initiatives were strongly promoted by the top 
management team, they drastically differ in their underlying goals. In fact, whereas the 
former was activated with a mere intent to improve the internal productivity, the latter 
was mainly promoted to conform to the industry benchmarks in order to gain legitimacy.  
The next two sections provide a description of these mechanisms. 
 
The Nineties: The introduction of IT systems 
Since the beginning of the nineties, the firm started a process of diffusion of 
Information Technology devices and procedures, which was still ongoing when the 
analysis was conducted in 2010. The main goal was to use the IT systems to improve 
efficiency and reduce the risks associated with possible procedural mistakes. All the 
organizational areas were interested by this pervasive changing process as the IT systems 
have a full application both in productive units  to set and monitor the equipment and 
plants and in all the administrative structures of the organization under different forms, 
such as an accounting software or databases to support the maintenance activities as well 
as the modules of business intelligence for managerial decisions. To efficiently manage 
the transition, an IT function was added to the organizational structure. This function was 
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mainly composed by an IT person who was in charge of helping the workers understand 
and use the software and to interact with the external firms in charge of co-designing, 
installing and maintaining the apparatus. 
 Inevitably, the IT systems had a quite major impact on the organizational routines 
that were, at the time the IT started developing, already consolidated according to the 
evolution illustrated in the prior section. Among all the micro activities that were updated 
as a consequence of the introduction of the IT systems, a main area deserves special 
attention. Beyond the obvious impact on the rapidity and amount of the internal 
communication to and from other business units and with colleagues of the same 
department due to the introduction of emails, the IT systems represented a pretext to 
review each procedure and to try to understand whether or not the systems could help 
smooth some micro tasks or reduce the workload through an automatically performed 
task. This review process was a crucial driver of dynamism for the organizational 
routines as it resulted in dedicated analytic attention to processes and tasks that were 
usually executed without deliberation. Most importantly, during this review process,each 
routine achieved customized modifications while increasing the overall uniformity of 
behavior. Take as an example the five units consisting of the production shifts in Alpha, 
each with a distinct leader who promoted a different behavioral form while oriented 
toward the same goal. The activity of the IT manager was twofold. To identify specific 
needs of each sub-unit and to homogenize the procedures across units. A shift may 
privilege an electronic template to manage the shift records whereas another shift may 
prefer to operate an electronic scan of a pre-defined hand-filled form. Nonetheless, both 
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the shifts needed to adopt a delivery procedure that was able to work timely when 
requested by the production process. As the IT manager stated: 
 
“Before the introduction of the IT systems everything was different. A system drives you 
to run a common procedure and above all it forces you to adopt a common behavior. If 
you don’t have a system you have plenty of different behaviors and only one of them is 
right. The others are just likely to be wrong. Take the production shifts. We have five 
teams with five leaders. When I had to write the formal procedures I had to interact with 
five different lines of thoughts. I had to negotiate and mediate, but eventually I was able 
to find a sort of common ground across them. In essence, they kept doing what they were 
used to doing but this rough common procedures had a substantial influence, for instance 
to reduce the risk of incidents at the plant or to improve the efficiency of the 
maintenance.” (IT Manager) 
 
 Further, not only have the IT systems been considered by the organization actors 
as a very flexible innovation tool that could adapt to their daily activities, but given their 
plastic nature and the direct support of the new function, they have eventually been 
perceived as a set of tools that could help solve concrete operating problems. The 
pipeline of pending requests for specific functionalities or IT tools has quickly become 
quite long since the IT function was created. This aspect turned the employees from users 
into creators of the system itself and made IT a fully integrated part of the daily activity.  
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“If you have an operating problem you can usually solve it by putting your hands on the 
software. We first analyze the problem together and then we submit it to the IT person 
who will then try to make the system find a solution for us. If it is possible, the solution is 
found internally. Otherwise the software firm has to be involved to help modify the system 
and find a suitable solution” (Administration Manager). 
  
In sum, the introduction of the IT systems had the purpose of increasing 
efficiency and control of the firm’s daily activities. To fulfill this objective all the 
organizational routines had to be revisited and restyled. The IT systems was seen as a 
crucial tool to initiate a process of routines restyle aimed to increase daily productivity 
This two-way iterative adaptation process has become part of continuous development of 
routines and IT systems in parallel.  
  
 
“I joined the firm when it was in transition from one system to another. Therefore, I was 
deeply involved in this change. However, since then, things have never stopped mutating. 
We have been refining the system in order to meet the needs of everyone in our 
department. We are slowly evolving by adding more and more parts in the management 
software. (Administration Manager) 
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The Two Thousands: The Quest for Certifications 
During the first decade of the two thousands another major set of practices was 
introduced under the force of external institutional pressures. Specifically, the firm 
intended to get aligned with its competitors by introducing the standardized certifications 
protocols. In only few years, the organization has produced a consistent effort to obtain 
these certifications. Specifically, Alpha obtained the environmental management system 
certification (ISO 14001), the safety management system (BS OHSAS 18001), the 
quality management system (ISO 9001), the certificate of excellence (Certiquality) and 
the organization modeling system based on the act 231 for virtuous firms. As for the IT 
systems, the implementation of the projects was assigned to a newly generated 
organization function, specifically designed for this task. The structure of each 
certification was quite similar. A firm that intends to obtain a certificate needs to comply 
with a specific set of moderately loose guidelines “the manual” and needs to be prepared 
to pass the checklist evaluations that the inspectors conduct during the visits to the plant. 
The manuals include practices that have a potentially pervasive impact on various 
organizational routines. Simply put, two main areas of important impact were the 
operating procedures – i.e. those that refer to the typical productive operating activity, 
such as the routines to manage the chemical reactions – and the security and safety 
procedures designed to prevent and manage accidents.  
 In regard of the former, unlike what occurred for the IT systems, the interaction 
between the manual and the established routines clashed. In fact, the organizational 
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routines, instead of becoming more plastic became more rigid and employees were 
skeptical when these routines conflicted with the prescribed practices.  
 
“If we want to talk about methodologies that are in the manuals that don’t refer to 
security systems I’d better not answer as I would be quite rude. I just don’t believe it. I 
don’t believe it, because where people have developed their experience there has always 
been a continuous improvement. We don’t need these things. Of course if these 
certifications have created some jobs fine.  
We write our own rules and we fully respect them. We are those who decide what to do 
and what to write in our manual. Therefore, I cannot delegate someone else to monitor 
what I do, unless I have to apply rules that are defined from a third party. If I drive a car, 
I need a driving license but if I make the Law in my house it doesn’t make sense that 
someone else comes here to control what I do.  
If I write that a plant can only run from 0 to 100, but then in order to achieve a 
contingent goal I run it at 102, no matter what the operating manual states. (Production 
Shift Manager) 
  
Nonetheless, despite the strong and diffused skepticism regarding the adaptation 
of the manuals, all the certificates were successfully obtained. Moreover, the manager in 
charge of implementing the certification system was genuinely convinced that the manual 
had in fact a full application.  
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“I think I have a methodology that allows me to face the problems. I have been refining 
this methodology on a day-by-day basis. During the years I found a fruitful terrain to 
develop my analytic approach. When we introduced the quality certification systems, we 
really diffuse a management method around. It is a very structured method. Since we 
have introduced it, people cannot take shortcuts anymore to execute a certain task. If you 
take a shortcut, you certainly overlook something that you may have needed. This is 
crucial to achieve your goals.” (Quality Manager) 
 
 This co-existence of elusive or indifferent reactions on the one hand and 
successful compliance on the other is itself the result of a learned practice that the 
organizational actors mastered. Specifically, the organizational actors showed limited 
interest and involvement in the operating innovations introduced by the quality manuals, 
but they were able to meet the goal to obtain the certificates. This dual behavior was not 
developed without a cost as the dress code compliance with respect to the certifications 
required a quite deep knowledge of the formal manuals and a prompt reaction to the 
demanding inspective visits.  
 
We all know very well that we need to know these rules and adopt a certain behavior. 
Because when an inspection comes, everyone of us does his or her best to behave; but, 
even if we fail the certification, we do what we do anyway.” (Production Shift Manager) 
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Clearly, as per the content of the operating routines, we observed that some 
inspiration or incremental change did occur. However, in their essence, the existing 
procedures persisted. As mentioned earlier, this persistence occurred as the top 
management placed substantial importance to the goal of mere compliance for the 
purpose of obtaining the certificate – a goal that was indeed achieved. 
 Conversely, the set of prescriptions that were dedicated to security and safety 
found an actual and supportive implementation. Specifically, the workers used the 
manuals to update and consolidate their security and safety procedures with proactivity 
and willingness. In this case, the points of view of the security manager and of the 
adopters were convergent. 
 
“See, I have a rather limited experience as I have joined the firm only one year and a 
half ago. What I noticed is that in this period of introduction of this new certification, 
people were initially very reluctant to change. However, they then become much more 
convergent. I mean not only the managers, but also the workers. I have clearly seen that 
all these people were willing to improve our security procedures”. (Security Manager) 
  
“Talking about security manuals, I cannot be more compliant. I even put my helmet and 
glasses on when I shower! I am joking, but working in our plant is not a joke. Security 
procedures that we know are effective must be strictly followed and in other cases we 
have to keep studying hard to see what we can do to reduce the risks.”  (Production Shift 
Manager). 
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 Unlike the case of the generic operating routines that were developed upon solid 
bases of practical knowledge cumulated over twenty years of applications, the security 
procedures interplayed with the guidelines imposed by the certificates by becoming more 
plastic instead of becoming more rigid. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
To date, it is still an open theoretical question as to how organizational routines 
evolve under the pressure of institutional forces. In this work, we focused on two 
alternative types of forces and investigated through a grounded theory approach the 
emergent dynamic mechanisms in a medium-sized firm. Specifically, we studied the 
impact of IT systems and quality certification on the ecology of internal routines that the 
firm developed since its origins. These two forces were purposefully investigated to 
distinguish between initiatives that were primarily driven by direct economic reasons, 
such as to increase efficiency and productivity by introducing IT systems, and by reasons 
mainly linked with the gain of legitimacy within the organizational field, as for the case 
of quality certifications.  
 While both these forces had an effect on organizational routines, not surprisingly 
we found that established routines tend to resist to incremental updates proposed by 
middle management (Dosi, Nelson, & Winter, 2000; Szulanski, 1996). In fact, routines 
tended to preserve their core essence during their transmission from one manager to 
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another via a mentorship system. Moreover, they also showed resistance to minor 
changes proposed by the leaders during execution.  
 IT systems and quality certifications indeed altered the existing behavior in a very 
distinct fashion depending on the nature of the routines subject to change when the forces 
started operating. Specifically, IT systems rapidly and pervasively diffused within the 
web of existing behaviors. The procedures defined by the software and the rules 
developed in-house engaged a process of reciprocal revision that ended up in a successful 
adaptation. On the other hand, the guidelines defined by the quality manuals had an 
opposing impact on the operating routines and on the security and safety procedures. 
Regarding the former, the organization showed a marked skepticism and a substantial 
indifference with respect to the rules. Nonetheless, the workers produced a dedicated 
extra effort to both successfully complying with the rules on the surface and, at the same 
time, to substantially retain the existing habits, which were considered as superior 
practices. However, as per the security and safety procedures, the organization showed 
strong flexibility by substantially altering the existing procedure to comply with the 
quality manuals. In other words, while the organizational actors were strongly motivated 
to redesign the security and safety procedures according to the prescriptions of the quality 
manuals, they showed a marked reluctance and skepticism toward altering the existing 
operational procedures that referred to core processes such as production, marketing or 
sales. Moreover, not only did the organizational actors show marked proclivity to retain 
the existing operating procedures, but they also learned the rules contained in the manual 
and developed a compliant behavior only for the purpose of obtaining the certificate. 
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These findings are foundational for a more general emergent theoretical apparatus 
on routines dynamics under the pressure of institutional forces. We found that the goals 
underlying the introduction of an institutionalized initiative ultimately drive the adaptive 
dynamics of internal organizational routines. When the initiative is mainly introduced for 
economic reasons, as in our case occurred for the IT systems, the organization comply 
with this goal by becoming more plastic. When legitimacy is the main driver at the base 
of the initiative the organization’s alignment to this main goal leads to a different 
adaptive mechanism. In fact, routines react either by strongly reshaping their essence or 
by building barriers in altering the design of well-established behavioral forms. Either 
way, the main organizational goal is achieved although, in this latter case, the 
organization does need to produce an extra effort to comply with the institutional 
manuals, but at the same time favors the retention of the existing behaviors. 
 This word offers an interesting contribution for management theories as it sheds 
light on the mechanisms through which organizations develop their behavior under the 
pressure of external forces. Although institutional theorists have predicted the tendency 
of the organizations to develop clustered isomorphic forms, our findings suggest that this 
phenomenon may only occur on the surface. In fact, as originally suggested by Oliver 
(1991), we theorize that populations of firms that adopt institutionalized practices fail to 
adopt common behaviors. Conversely, we found that depending on the goal setting 
underlying the adoption of the initiatives undertaken, based on higher content of 
legitimacy under pure institutional forces and lower under what we termed as non-
institutional, organizations respond by activating different evolutionary mechanisms. As 
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a consequence, we theorize that there exist two sources of variability that influence the 
behavioral evolution of an organization under the pressure of institutional forces. On the 
one hand, at the managerial level, the configuration of the system of goals will influence 
the contextual nature of the initiative in a continuum between pure institutional and non-
institutional driven by the content of legitimacy. On the other hand, at the organizational 
level, existing routines activate alternative adaptive mechanisms based on the underlying 
goal of the initiative. Pure institutional pressures forces to internal routines to activate 
internal selective mechanisms, whereas non-institutional initiatives increase the level of 
plasticity of internal practiced that engage a process of mutual adaptation.  
A more general consequence is that this plurality of firm-specific sources of 
variability, in contrast with the argument of isomorphism, suggests the occurrence of 
behavioral polyphormism across individual organizations, regardless of their membership 
to a certain field. In fact, organizations, when exposed to pressures to introduce identical 
practices, eventually generate a highly idiosyncratic set of reactions thus defining a rather 
unique path of behavioral development. 
 
Insert Figure 3.1 About Here 
 
It is worth noting that our focus is on the impact of exogenous forces on the 
redesign of existing routines, rather than on the variability in the adoption of new 
innovation systems that organizations display. In fact, while several prior studies have 
investigated how organizations differently interpret the adoption of IT systems 
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(Orlikowski, 2001; Orlikowski, 2000) or TQM practices (Westphal et al, 1997), we know 
precious little of the effect that these new systems have on the design of the existing 
organizational procedures. This distinction is subtle, but relevant. The former case refers 
either to the mere interpretation or sense-making that the organizations attribute to the 
new system, as for the case of TQM, or to the emphasis that different employees may 
display in the use of a different subset of functions than the IT systems allow. The latter 
points to the actual modifications in the existing procedures that these systems trigger 
once adopted.  
Combining institutional theory and evolutionary perspective, our study also 
contributes to the research approach that – relying on Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) idea of 
decoupling – looked at the interplay of intra-organizational dynamics and institutional 
changes (Smets, Morris, & Greenwood, 2012). Scholars investigated the influence of 
intra-organizational elements – such as interests and values (Edelman, 1990; Pache & 
Santos, 2010), “sense-making” role of occupational groups (Dobbin, 2009; Dobbin, 
1992) – on the selection of organizational responses to institutional pressures. Our 
findings point out the nature of institutional forces – in terms of degree and content of 
legitimacy – as a key trigger of different organizational responses in terms of selective or 
adaptive behavior.  
Should these elements find empirical support, they would represent a fruitful 
foundational terrain for further theoretical and empirical investigations on organizational 
adaptation and evolution. 
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3.4 Figures 
 
Figure 3.1 Routines Dynamics Under the Pressure of Institutional and Non-
Institutional Forces 
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4 DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Alessandro Marino 
 
Organizations are complex compositions of elements such as people, projects, 
administrative structures, and rules (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; Thompson, 1967; 
Weick, 1969). These heterogeneous elements may get recombined and may modify over 
an organization’s lifetime, and so may the routines and capabilities that stem from them 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Hence, adaptation entails the continuous 
reconfiguration of their related tangible expressions (such as artifacts or products). In the 
latest fifteen years, research on dynamic capabilities has investigated this phenomenon 
both theoretically and empirically. In this paper, the focus is on product adaptation as a 
specific subset of the larger domain of dynamic capabilities. More precisely, the focus is 
on the capacity of an organization to update, reconfigure, and develop its core products in 
order to meet the requirements of the changing environment (herein generally termed as 
dynamic capabilities). Indeed, the existing literature has considered product development 
as a key expression of an organization’s dynamic capability (Danneels, 2002; Helfat & 
Raubitschek, 2000; Teece et al., 1997). Teece and Pisano (1994) define dynamic 
capabilities as “the subset of the competences/capabilities which allow the firm to create 
new products and processes and respond to changing market circumstances.” 
Researchers on dynamic capabilities identify and analyze the set of processes or 
capacities that enables the organization to reconfigure its resource base (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000; Helfat et al., 2007; Teece et al., 1997). However, these authors are careful 
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to be agnostic as to whether these capabilities are effectively beneficial for an 
organization. In fact, the definition of dynamic capabilities per se does not presume any 
wisdom or foresight as to which attributes are more or less valuable in determining future 
performance (Helfat et al., 2007). The present study attempts to identify the drivers that 
link an organization’s dynamic capabilities with firm performance. 
One important driver refers to the organization’s level of prior experience in 
adaptation.6 A strong consensus has emerged on the major role that adaptation experience 
plays in the continuous development of an organization’s dynamic capabilities by 
increasing an organization’s capacity to integrate, modify and extend its resource base. 
Helfat et al. (2007) characterize dynamic capabilities as a capacity to perform a 
repeatable and at least minimally reliable task. This implies that what distinguishes a 
dynamic capability from an ad hoc problem solving activity is the fact that the former 
entails some recurrent and enduring patterned actions. In the same spirit, Winter (2003) 
argues that these abilities are based on cumulative experiential learning. In other words, 
routinizing the organization’s capacity to change favors future adaptive efforts. 
Therefore, these properties can be interpreted as capabilities in that they are learned, 
refined and cumulated over time by the organization. Similarly, Eisenhardt and Martin 
(2000) suggest that the learning processes at the base of dynamic capabilities are mostly 
repeated practice, past mistakes, and the pace of experience, whereas Zollo and Winter 
(2002) stressed the importance of multiple learning mechanisms for the genesis of 
dynamic capabilities. As a result, the concept of dynamic capability in and of itself 
                                                
6 Herein the labels prior experience in adaptation or adaptation experience are used interchangeably to refer to product 
adaptation experience. 
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suggests that a learning process is carried on by the organization to master adaptive 
behaviors or attributes. Experience allows the organization to store knowledge in 
patterned routines (Teece et al., 1997, p 520), which in turn enable the integration, 
extension, and reconfiguration of resources (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Helfat et al., 
2007; Sull, 1999). Danneels (2008) defines dynamic capabilities as an second-order 
competence with respect to the purpose of learning new tasks. Therefore, instead of 
existing dynamic capabilities constraining their future expression, they are functional to 
their continuous development. In agreement with this view, Teece et al. (1997) posit that 
since the capacity to reconfigure and transform is itself a learned organizational skill – 
the more frequently it is practiced, the easier it is accomplished. In their study of 
alliances, Kale and Singh (2007) found that an experienced alliance function could boost 
future firm’s alliance success by smoothing the errors in alliance learning processes. 
Yet, to what extent dynamic capabilities developed by a long-standing adaptation 
experience will lead to superior firm performance at a specific point in time indeed 
depends on several contingent elements. On the one hand, alternative forms of adaptation 
experience may be differently relevant to this function depending on their fit with the task 
environment (Eggers, 2012). For instance, prior experience dedicated to adapting a 
specific subset of a product’s components may be more relevant for future adaptations in 
that set of elements. However, in this work, the focus is on the most general expression of 
adaptation experience, which emerges from the past exposure of an organization to any 
type of changing event. The general expression of adaptation experience captures at the 
highest-level the notion of dynamic capabilities and reflects an enduring and robust 
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capacity for organizational change. In other words, dynamic capabilities based on 
specific forms of experience are likely to be more functional for specific purposes of 
change. In contrast, those based on general prior adaptation experience have the 
interesting potential property that they are in principle independent of any particular task 
environment – an aspect that makes them potentially useful for adaptations of any kind. 
In sum, this research considers the role of a general prior experience in product 
adaptation (herein generally termed as adaptation experience) in influencing firm 
performance by developing a capacity to face any future product adaptation event. 
On the other hand, other concurrent organizational factors may increase or reduce the 
value of adaptation experience depending on the characteristics of the task environment.7 
As noted above, critical to the concept of dynamic capabilities is the notion that 
adaptation can be interpreted as a process (or a procedure) that is understood, learned and 
refined. With respect to such mechanisms, it has been mentioned that adaptation 
experience plays indeed a major role. However, to fully understand the relationship 
between adaptation experience and firm performance, it is relevant to evaluate the 
intensity and nature of the recent adaptive activity that the organization has been 
undertaking. Consider an organization that has recently conducted an intense adaptation 
of a specific subset of product components A. Should the current adaptation task be 
centered on the same set of components A, the implications will be twofold. Firstly, the 
organization will rely on a set of adaptive capabilities that have recently been activated 
                                                
7 It is worth mentioning that firm performance are then also directly influenced by factors that are not directly related 
to the level of adaptation experience and dynamic capabilities such as the intensity of competition or the characteristics 
of the market demand (Helfat et al., 2007). 
 
 
 63 
and maintained. In this regard, Helfat et al. (2007: 21) argue that “unlike in standard 
economic theory, capabilities often have the property that they function less well if they 
are not used. Capabilities incorporate the knowledge of individuals and teams of how to 
perform a task or set of tasks. Most knowledge that resides within an organization has the 
property that it is remembered by doing. Thus to maintain a capability and the knowledge 
that underpins the capability, an organization may need to use it”. Secondly, this recent 
adaptation activity will capture a sense of flux and possible recent experiments and 
associated variety in the domain of technical elements that will need to be updated (i.e. 
components A). The amount of available technical solutions in an organization and their 
characteristics with respect to the environmental needs will then drastically influence the 
outcome of the adaptive process (Aldrich, 1999; Helfat et al., 2007; Makadok, 2001; 
Siggelkow, 2002). In sum, recent adaptation activity in domains associated with the 
current task environment (herein termed as focal activity8) may influence the adaptation 
outcome as it maintains relevant adaptive processes and stimulates the emergence of 
technical variety, which refers to the degree of heterogeneity in components, 
technologies, and in general all the technical elements that can be associated with a 
product’s design.  
Along these two dimensions of adaptation experience and focal activity four 
alternative complementary interactions can be defined. With the presence of adaptation 
experience a setting with greater concurrent level of focal activity will make the firm in 
                                                
8 As mentioned the term “focal” is both linked with the fit between the domain in which the adaptation activity has 
occurred and the domain of the ongoing change effort and with the temporal restriction for an immediately recent 
timeframe. 
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principle more adaptive, all other things being equal. Product adaptation experience 
provides crucial general guidelines for future product change whereas focal activity 
activates specific adaptation capabilities and stimulates technical variety. An organization 
may have a high level of recombinative (Kogut & Zander, 1993) or integrative (Brusoni 
et al., 2001) capabilities, but the impact of those capabilities depends on the “fodder” 
available for those recombinative or integrative efforts. In other words, adaptation 
experience allows the organization to design a change process based on solid 
foundations, but then the outcome of the process in terms of potentially suitable 
alternatives is larger with the presence of higher focal activity. Conversely, when the 
latter is low or absent, the organization is still knowledgeable on dynamic processes but 
the outcome may be suboptimal, as the adaptive process can generate a smaller set of 
potentially valid alternatives. On the other hand, when adaptation experience is weak, an 
organization with greater level of focal activity lacks solid adaptive guidance but it has 
activated processes that are in line with the present change effort and displays higher 
technical heterogeneity due to the recent adaptive activity in elements that are subject to 
current change effort. In the absence of both adaptation experience and focal activity, the 
adaptive process is naively designed with no specific guidelines and then executed in a 
relatively static and homogeneous organizational setting. See Figure 1 for a summary of 
the alternative states that a changing organization may display at a point in time based on 
its levels of adaptation experience and focal activity. 
 
Insert Figure 4.1 About Here 
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Nonetheless, the concurrent presence of adaptation experience and focal activity 
does not necessarily produce net positive effects on firm performance. To fully capture 
the relevant facets of the phenomenon, an additional contingency has to be considered. 
An important distinction with respect to organizational adaptation efforts refers to the 
timing of adaptation (Ahuja & Katila, 2001), as the intensity of the changes needed may 
drastically vary at different points in time. Being adaptive is a property that has value 
when change is required. Elsewhere, the costs associated with dynamic capabilities and 
focal activity may outweigh the benefits (Helfat et al., 2007). In other words, depending 
on the magnitude of the changes in the environment, the sign of focal activity as a 
moderator of the relationship between adaptation experience and firm performance is 
likely to be different.  
With the presence of fairly intense and rapid environment change, the co-
occurrence of experience in product adaptation and focal activity tends to be synergic. In 
fact, in the case of a major adaptation effort, as the organization needs to quickly and 
drastically redefine its product, prior adaptation experience and focal activity will have 
mutually reinforcing joint effects. It has already been mentioned that the availability of 
recently maintained dynamic capabilities favors the execution of a prompt major 
adaptation effort (Helfat et al., 2007). Moreover, adaptation experience will be 
consistently more effective for the purpose of reconfiguring the existing product set if the 
organization has recently generated a high level of technical variety. In this regard, Iansiti 
and Clark (1994) highlight the finding that organizations with greater adaptation 
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experience in product development generated superior performance in adaptation, which 
they termed dynamic performance, because of the superior capacity of these firms to 
integrate diverse knowledge bases. Consider an organization that displays considerable 
experience in changing the core characteristics of its products or services. In the event of 
an emergent need to redefine its main product, the company may find it useful to follow a 
specific sequence of actions to achieve the final goal, such as asking the marketing team 
to redefine the product specifications, submitting new functional blueprints to the 
production unit, and letting the marketing team test the prototypes and suggest 
incremental changes until a final version has been generated. However, this process will 
be effective if the marketing team – the department with the major responsibilities – is 
able to generate valuable alternative products plans in a timely fashion. This 
circumstance is favored if the marketing team has been developing in the recent past a 
heterogeneous set of different products and/or consistently different generations of 
similar products.  
Heterogeneity will in fact increase the range of possible recombinations and 
redeployments associated with the team’s dynamic capabilities. As suggested by 
Campbell (1960; 1982), variety is a crucial attribute that regulates the evolutionary 
mechanism. Rerup and Feldman (2011) show how routine evolution and learning unfold 
through heterogeneous trial and error processes. Other studies highlight that variety tends 
to favor organization learning (Cattani, 2005; Schilling, Vidal, Ployhart, & Marangoni, 
2003). More specifically with respect to product adaptation, variety plays a central role 
by broadening the range of potential major reconfigurations that the organization can 
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arrange within a narrow time horizon (Aldrich, 1999; Baum & Campbell, 1999; Fleming, 
2001; Galunic & Rodan, 1998; Karim & Mitchell, 2000). Consider a company that adopts 
a new technology to produce a specific component. In the event that in a narrow time 
horizon the company needs to operate a major reconfiguration of the same component (or 
of a similar one), regardless of the company’s prior product adaptation experience, the 
overall range of technologies from which it can reliably and promptly draw will have an 
enormous influence of its effective adaptive capacity.  Take Apple as a concrete example. 
Since the launch of the iPod in 2001, the company has been able to achieve numerous 
successes by redeploying and recombining a consistent set of heterogeneous and 
innovative features that its products have developed across generations (e.g., the 
definition of the iPhone based on the new features developed for the iPod Touch and 
subsequently the production of the Ipad based on the combination of the characteristics of 
the iPod Touch and the new generations of MacBook). 
 
Hypothesis 1 follows. 
 
HP 1. All other things being equal, with the presence of higher environmental dynamism, 
the level of focal activity will positively moderate the relationship between adaptation 
experience and firm performance 
 
On the other hand, a large set of studies on dynamic capabilities maintain that 
experienced dynamic capabilities not only are relevant in highly turbulent settings, but 
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they also matter in moderately changing contexts (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Helfat 
and Winter (2011) generalize this argument by highlighting that dynamic capabilities are 
developed regardless of the level of change that occurs in the external environment. 
Nonetheless, they note that the type of adaptive activities that are conducted is indeed 
different depending on the magnitude of the environmental changes. Unlike in a context 
of intense environmental change in a relatively stable setting, dynamic capabilities based 
on long-standing adaptation experience are likely to serve as enhancers of incremental 
fine-tunings to the existing set of resources. As a result, a recent adaptation activity will 
provide little beneficial maintenance for the purpose of incremental adaptation. 
Moreover, in a relatively stable setting, dynamic capabilities may efficiently drive 
incremental fine-tunings that follow a predictable path without benefiting from the 
presence of highly heterogeneous elements. In other words, technical variety associated 
with the presence of focal activity not only may not be needed but it may represents a 
source of unnecessary, distracting and costly experimentation (Drnevich & Kriauciunas, 
2011; Ocasio, 1997; Zollo & Winter, 2002), as opposed to being a positive factor in 
exploiting existing operating capabilities. In sum, focal activity is expected to negatively 
moderate the effectiveness of product adaptation experience.   
 
Hypothesis 2 follows. 
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HP 2. All other things being equal, with the presence of lower environmental dynamism, 
the level of focal activity will negatively moderate the relationship between adaptation 
experience and firm performance 
 
4.1 Data And Methods 
To test these hypotheses a longitudinal dataset in the Formula One (hereafter F1) 
racing industry was collected. The data trace the evolution of the technological 
developments that occurred in the whole population of F1 companies from 1981 to 2010. 
This time interval covers the entire “modern” history of the industry, as 1981 was the 
year the racing companies started developing their chasses in-house.  
The F1 racing competition represents the pinnacle of the technological evolution in 
the sports automotive sector. A series of races take place during a yearly season in 
different circuits located worldwide. The races started during the 1920s in Europe but 
became popular worldwide after World War II. Until the 1970s, the F1 championship 
was attracting a limited amount of sponsorships. Subsequently, thanks to the growing 
visibility of the races (and the cars), F1 began to attract considerably greater resources. A 
major contributor to this development was the increasing television audience that the 
sport generated over time. The racing series provided a non-paralleled stage for 
advertisers, not only in traditional TV advertisements but also the opportunity to promote 
brands on the physical spaces at the racetrack, cars, and even on the racers themselves.    
For the automotive companies involved in F1 racing the stakes associated with 
successful, or less successful competition in the racing circuit are quite high.  First, the 
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direct official prize money to the winners represents significant revenue for the F1 racing 
organizations. Second, the winners are able to generate a strong corporate image that may 
be exploited in adjacent markets through branding strategies. Third, the parent 
automotive companies that invest part of their budgets in the F1 cars may consider these 
investments large-scale R&D laboratories, given the intense efforts in technological 
developments that are required to compete successfully. The technological innovations 
are often imported back into the design and development production processes of the 
commercial vehicles produced for the mass market. Finally, the most successful F1 
racing cars are able to attract much greater financial resources from their sponsors. 
Apart from the central role played by activities associated with product 
development in this setting, this context offers a number of other attractive features. 
Unlike other business organizations, these companies operate in a very specific, 
controlled environment. In particular, the near-term shifts in the environmental setting 
that these companies may follow largely depend upon the sportive rules and technical 
regulations set by the institution that governs the F1 championship, the Fédération 
International de l’Automobile (FIA). This peculiar features allows for an explicit 
characterization of the nature and intensity of the evolutionary changes that these 
companies face. Consider the case of a major change in the technical regulations from 
one season to another. In such an environment, the companies must reconfigure 
themselves in order to adapt to the new rules in a very short time-frame. The changes in 
the regulations thus represent the shocks that modify the external environment in which 
these firms operate and trigger mechanisms of rapid adaptation.  
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Moreover, the articulation of the business cycle in this industry is particularly 
suitable for studying dynamic capabilities. In fact, Helfat and Winter (2011) warn that 
whether or not one is able to observe capabilities that promote change may depend on the 
granularity of observation as change typically fails to occur at regular time intervals. 
However, in F1 this general challenge is lessened as the seasonal structure of the sport 
sets apart moments of adaptive learning and reconfiguration of the main design. 
Specifically, the racing companies spend 3-4 months per year (typically from December 
to March) developing their new car model by adapting to the new regulations and 
pursuing their technological trajectories in their quest for enhanced performance. More 
precisely, the performance obtained in the prior years informs the decisions about which 
technical components to retain and reinforce and which to select out (e.g. a specific gear 
or breaking system or a set of aerodynamic components). On the other hand, during the 
championship season (typically from March to December), the teams focus on the intense 
exploitation of the existing cars that are taken as a given until a new model is developed. 
The enormous set of information collected during the sportive season then helps define 
the new car model evolution for the following season.  
The data on F1 analyzed in the present work were collected from historical 
archives. The contemporary press releases of the official FIA regulations from 1981 to 
2010 were invaluable for keeping track of the modifications that occurred in the technical 
regulations which constituted the external environment for the racing teams. To chart the 
technological development of each of the F1 racing teams, several secondary sources — 
mainly covering race accounts, commentary and elaborations of the specialized press and 
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of scientific (and quasi-scientific) research articles — were analyzed. This effort was 
quite challenging because of the need to obtain a homogeneous set of information for a 
long time span.  In addition, some companies did not leave a salient trace in the popular 
media. Among the sources containing relevant information were Autosport Magazine, 
The Great Encyclopedia of Formula One, Who Works in Formula One 1993-2009, and 
Fomula One Technical Analysis 1989-2010.  
The resulting panel includes 345 team-year observations for a total of 49 racing 
companies over 30 years. The panel is unbalanced given that only a few F1 racing teams 
in existence in 1981 were able to survive the whole reference period. In addition, several 
teams were born subsequent to 1981. On average 10-15 teams were active each season. 
The dataset reported no missing values on the covariates for each team-year observation.9  
 
4.1.1 Measures 
Firm Performance. The dependent variable was calculated as follows. Initially, 
the best time per lap10 obtained by the cars of each team — typically two cars for each 
team11 — in each race of each season was collected. These values were then divided by 
each respective race’s average time per lap across teams. To generate a scale that 
assigned higher values to better performers the reciprocals of these ratios were then 
                                                
9 Since many of the measures of the independent variables computed in the following analysis were based on 
variations between years, the observations related to the first year of each company’s appearance were used only as 
initial reference points and did not directly enter the regression analyses. As a result, the sample used in the following 
analysis decreased to 293 observations. 
10 The time per lap is computed by dividing the total time obtained in a specific race by the number of laps completed. 
11 The cars produced by each team are almost identical at the beginning of each season, except for some minor 
customizations that are specific to each driver, such as the pilot seats. Then, in race after race, the differences across 
each team’s car may increase as a result of diverging configurations in specific components. 
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taken. Therefore, this index assigns for each race a value higher than 1 to the teams that 
performed better (faster) than the average time per lap, and vice versa. Finally, the annual 
value of the variable for each team was computed by averaging across the races of the 
season. 
To adjust for skewness of the resulting distribution, the STATA 11 procedure 
bcskew0 was applied in order to obtain a Box-Cox transformation with lambda equal to 
4.363.12 The transformed variable fully satisfied the normality requirement. This measure 
was chosen and refined after several discussions with industry experts, and it is intended 
to best represent the performance of a team’s technological potentials. Nonetheless, as 
robustness, several alternative measures of performance were tested, such as the average 
classifications of each car, the number of points obtained during the championship season 
and the average lap time obtained by each car for each race. All these measures were 
correlated with the measure used in the analysis and produced consistent results.  
 
4.1.2 Independent Variables 
The measures for the independent variables and the controls were coded using the 
archival materials. First, in conjunction with a panel of industry experts, a set of criteria 
were specified to code the degree of change in both the F1 cars and in the environment.  
The coding itself was carried out by three coders working independently. These 
individual coding outputs were compared and yielded a level of inter-rater agreement 
                                                
12  The resulting variable was obtained by calculating the following power expression: (performance^4.363-1)/4.363. 
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above 0.9. This result was largely expected given the high level of objectivity of the 
coding process. The few diverging values were carefully reviewed and the variables 
recoded after agreement was reached on the most appropriate evaluation. Three 
independent variables and three controls were obtained. The coding process was 
completed in a period of three months. 
 
Change in the Technical Regulations. The intensity of the changes in the 
regulatory body was coded by capturing the disruptiveness of the changes imposed by the 
technical authority, the FIA, from one season to another. As a first step the body of rules 
was divided into six subareas that exhaustively represent all the possible topics associated 
with the full set of technical rules: chassis, engine, tires, mechanics, electronics and 
aerodynamics. In order to obtain a yearly measure of disruptiveness, the following 
procedure was conducted. A score of disruptiveness ranging from 0 to 3 was first 
attributed to the rule changes occurring in each subarea depending on the expected 
impact on the status quo. With the absence of any rule change in a subarea, a score of 0 
was assigned. In case of a pool of more incremental changes in the regulations in an area 
that alters the status quo of a prior set of rules in a limited way, a score ranging from 1 to 
2 was assigned. In case of major changes in the technical rules of an area, a score of 3 
was assigned. To obtain an overall score of disruptiveness, the average of the scores 
associated with each of the seven subareas was then computed. These scores were 
obtained by analyzing the official technical regulations released by the regulatory 
authority on a yearly basis. To further double-check the actual expected disruptiveness of 
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the technical rules, the comments that the specialized press published immediately after 
the communication of the new regulations were also considered. The tone and the 
emphasis of the experts were useful for capturing the more subtle characteristics of each 
technical rule. These articles were in general very detailed and provided clear evidence of 
the type of change that occurred in each year.  
 
Adaptation Experience. The operationalization of this variable must incorporate 
the cumulative general experience in product adaptation that a company has obtained 
until period t-1. Therefore, the first step is to obtain an index of yearly level of generic 
change for each organization’s products. The F1 racing organizations compete in the 
races by internally producing their own prototypes. Each subsequent generation of a car’s 
model includes elements of discontinuity with respect to the prior prototype. However, 
the degree of dissimilarity may substantially vary across subsequent models. A measure 
of the degree of dissimilarity across subsequent prototypes (herein labeled dik for year t 
and company k) was obtained by reconstructing the history of each model of each car 
produced by each team after decomposing the car’s components into the six subareas 
consistent with the areas for which the FIA regulations are defined: chassis, engine, tires, 
mechanics, electronics, and aerodynamics. More precisely, for each of these types of 
components the coders evaluated, on a scale from 0 to 3, the changes from one model of 
car to the subsequent model by adopting the following rules. An intermediate value was 
assigned for incremental modifications of the components, whether a technological fine-
tuning (assigned a 1) or a more consistent adjustments (assigned a 2). A value of 3 was 
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assigned in the presence of major discontinuity in the model of the car in comparison 
with the prior model. A grand index of change at the level of the team was computed by 
averaging across the values of change for each component of each new car prototype.13 In 
the great majority of cases each team produced only one model of car each year. 
Situations when a team produced more than one model per year were accounted for by 
coding the changes operating in all the models for that year, comparing each model’s 
components and the model’s components of the prior year and taking the maximum 
across these values of technological change.  
Because this index captured the differences from one model to the next, the very first 
model produced by each team in its history has been used as a reference point of 
observation. Nonetheless, this loss of data produced no relevant reduction in the 
statistical power. 
 The values of dik thus represent the intensity of the changes that a team k 
implements to its cars, typically in the periods between the end of each season and the 
beginning of the next, when a new model of car is presented (i.e., in year i). Accordingly, 
to capture the level prior experience in adaptation for each year i and organization k, the 
following expression was obtained:  
, 
                                                
13 As mentioned in the prior sections this work considers a general form of adaptation experience by cumulating each 
type of prior exposure of an organization to a change effort. Nonetheless, other forms of experience were tested, such 
as the prior adaptation experience on specific subsets of components, without obtaining any significant result in the 
analysis. 
AEik =
[δik ]
t=0
i−1
∑
Φi
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where AEik represents the cumulative product adaptation experience for year i and a 
company k, and dik is the average level of changes in the car produced by company k for 
year i with respect to the prior generation, and F is a discount factor calculated for each 
year i. 14  
  
Focal Activity. The level of focal activity refers to the recent adaptation activities 
operated in the set of components that are subject to change in the current year. 
Therefore, on the one hand, focal activity is reflected by the intensity of the changes 
occurring in the very latest product generation. Then, for the measure to capture the level 
of adaptation activity that is concretely functional to the adaptation efforts occurring at 
time i the following adjustment is required. Consider the six sets of components that 
define an F1 car (i.e., chassis, engine, aerodynamics, mechanical, electronics and tires). 
If, during the latest product development (i.e., at year i-1), an organization generated a 
higher adaptation activity in a group of subsets of components that are not subject to 
regulatory changes in the current year (i.e., at year i), then there will be little theoretical 
foundation as to why this adaptation activity can affect the relationship between 
adaptation experience and performance. For instance, there will be little plausible 
usefulness in displaying a very heterogeneous shelf of aerodynamic appendices if, for 
example, the organization has to design a completely new electronic gear control. For this 
                                                
14 As a baseline experience was discounted by a factor equal to the square root of the age of experience because it 
represents a gradual but nonetheless substantial decay in the organization’s knowledge. Consistent with Baum and 
Ingram (1998) and Kalnins and Mayer (2004), a no discount factor provided similar results, whereas the extremes of 
linear and quadratic discount factor provided no significant results. This aspect suggests that adaptation experience 
depreciates at the moderate rate of the square root of age. 
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reason, it is important to compute the level of focal activity associated with the 
components subject to regulatory change. More formally, the following expression is 
computed: 
, 
where FAik represents the degree of focal activity for a generic year i and a company k, m 
is the number of types of components typically distinguishable in F1 (set to 6, namely 
chassis, aerodynamic, mechanical, electronics, engine and tires), and  is obtained as 
follows:  
, 
where  is the level of changes occurring at year t in company k with respect to the set 
of components of type h and , a discrete variable equal to 0(1) in case of absence 
(presence) of changes imposed by the regulations in year t for the set of components of 
type h. 
 
4.1.3 Controls 
To control for possible alternative time-variant variables, three controls were 
generated. The decisions to replace the drivers and the chief engineers were coded for 
each team-year observation (labeled as Change Drivers and Change Engineers, 
FAik =
αi−1,k
h
h=1
m
∑
m
αik
h
αi−1,k
h =
δi−1,k
h regih > 0
0 otherwise
"
#
$
%$
δtk
h
regtkh
 
 
 79 
respectively). The intensity of these changes ranged from 0 to 2, with the value of 2 
indicating the full replacement of the two-person team and a value of 1 for the 
replacement of a single driver. Moreover, for each year i, a variable labeled Supplemental 
Development was coded to capture the changes to the car that were not triggered by a 
technical regulation. This variable captures the extent to which an organization tends to 
proactively modify its cars with respect to the prior generations beyond the changes 
imposed by the regulations in year i.  
Moreover, fixed effects for organization and year were introduced. In this setting, 
the importance of this technique is twofold. First, it produces standard errors that adjust 
for dependence due to repeated measures of organizations over time. In addition, it helps 
control for all stable characteristics of the racing teams. In this industry, each team can be 
easily associated with a specific group of organizations that share a common likelihood 
of success in the sportive competitions. Therefore, it is crucial to account for several 
team-level time-invariant characteristics, which may largely account for achieving 
average superior performance thus preventing the identification of the specific effects 
produced by the independent variables on firm performance (as previously mentioned in 
footnote 3). These variables include the average budget levels of the racing companies, 
the reputation and general capability of a team, which implies the ability to attract the 
best human capital available or more generally to collect the most valuable tangible and 
intangible resources. As a result, the introduction of team fixed effects is particularly 
appropriate to single out the differential impact of the central independent variables 
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(adaptation experience, focal activity and changes in the technical regualtions) on the 
whole performance of the firm with relatively limited confounding effects. 
Table 1 reports a summary of the main descriptive statistics and correlations associated 
with the dependent and independent variables and the controls.  
 
Insert Table 4.1 About Here 
 
4.2 Results 
To test the hypotheses the following dynamic panel data model with fixed effects 
and three-way interaction development was defined: 
 
Yi,k=b0+b1Yi-1,k+b2AEi,k +b3FAi,k+b4AEi,k FAi,k+b5CAEik CTRi+b6FAi,k CTRi + b7AEi,k FAi,k 
CTRi +b8DRi,k+b9CEi,k +b10SDi,k +Gk +Fi +ei,k   (1) 
 
with i=1,…,T (years); k=1,…,N (organizations); Y = Firm Performance; AE = Adaptation 
Experience; FA = Focal Activity; CTR = Changes in the Technical Regulations; DR = 
Change in the Drivers; CE = Change in the Engineers; SD = Supplemental Development; 
and Gi and Ft = organization and year fixed effects, respectively.15 
Estimating equation 1 requires special attention for endogeneity, unobserved 
heterogeneity and reverse causality for the following reasons. Firstly, the presence on the 
                                                
15 Note that the main effect for changes in the technical regulations was omitted due to collinearity with the fixed 
effects. 
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right-hand side of a lagged value of the dependent variable and of the fixed effects gives 
rise to the dynamic panels bias by making the coefficients estimated by ordinary least 
square biased and inconsistent (Nickell, 1981). Secondly, the independent variables AE, 
FA, and CTR may not be purely exogenous as they can be correlated with the error terms 
in future time periods. Therefore, to account for these issues, a GMM estimator was used 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991). Specifically, since the persistence of the dependent variable 
could cause weak instruments problems the two-step System-GMM estimation technique 
was preferred to the Difference-GMM (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 
1998). This estimator treats the model as a system of equations in which the variables are 
instrumented with lagged variables. More precisely, by adopting a conventional approach 
reported in the Stata Module xtabond2 (Roodman, 2005), year dummies were treated as 
exogenous and used as instruments, the independent variables and the control as 
predetermined and the lagged dependent variable as endogenous. Due to the large 
number of panels the high resulting number of available moments conditions was a 
potential source of overfitting bias (Baltagi, 2005). Therefore, as suggested by Roodman 
(2005) the number of instruments was taken as close as possible to the number of groups. 
More precisely, it was selected the least number of instruments that were able to pass the 
Sargan test.16  
                                                
16 To reduce the number of instruments generated only one lagged period was considered for each variable’s 
instruments (a lag distance of 2 periods for the variables treated as endogenous and of 1 period for the variables treated 
as predetermined). Moreover, the function collapse was used to generate one instrument for each variable and lag 
distance, rather than one for each time period, variable, and lag distance. 
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Table 2 reports the coefficients, significance levels, the number of instruments, 
the results of Wald, Arellano-Bond of type 1 and 2 and Sargan tests.17 Models 1 to 4 refer 
to the four-step moderated regression analysis. For each model the Sargan test reports not 
significant coefficients thus indicating the presence of suitable instruments.18 Similarly, 
the results of the Arellano-Bond tests indicate the absence of first and second order 
autocorrelation.19 Step 1 is reported in Model 1, in which only the controls are included. 
The results show that a higher tendency to change the team of engineers is associated 
with higher firm performance. A positive trend in the performance is indicated by the 
positive and significant coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. In Model 2 (Step 2), 
where only the main effects of the independent variables are added, the results show 
insignificant coefficients for both the independent variables and the performance trend, 
thus suggesting the absence of a significant direct effect of adaptation experience on firm 
performance. In step 3 reported in Model 3, in which all the two-way interaction terms 
are included, the coefficients for the main effects and the interaction terms are not 
significant and the lagged performance coefficient drastically increases and shows 
significance at p<0.1. Model 4 is the fourth step dedicated to testing the hypotheses. This 
full model provides relevant findings as all the variables except for the intensity of the 
changes in the team of drivers report statistically significant coefficients. Most 
                                                
17 The robust standard errors were conventionally computed by applying the Windmeijer correction (Windmeijer, 
2005). 
18 Recall that the Sargan test has a null hypothesis that the instruments as a group are exogenous. 
19 In the context of GMM estimation the AR(2) result is the more relevant test. In fact, applied on the residuals in first 
differences is used to detect AR(1) in the underlying levels variables. AR(1) is generally expected although in this 
analysis it is not detected. 
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importantly, the Model 4 shows that the coefficient of the three-way interaction term is 
positive and significant (B = 0.722, p<0.05). This element suggests the occurrence of a 
relevant moderation effect.  
To gain more insight and probe the three-way interaction term, several additional 
analyses were conducted according with the conventional approaches (Aiken & West, 
1991; Bauer & Curran, 2005; Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). In Figure 2, the 
graphs report the 95% confidence bands, and the region of significance of the simple 
slopes between Adaptation Experience and Firm Performance at representative levels of 
the moderators Focal Activity and Change in the Technical Regulations.20 The graphical 
analysis fully support the effects predicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2. To further assess the 
three-way moderating effects of both moderators, a supplemental table was generated. 
The values, reported in Table 3, clearly indicate that both focal activity and the changes 
in the technical regulations are relevant moderators of the relationship between 
adaptation experience and firm performance. More precisely, the figures in the table 
indicate that the role of focal activity as a moderator depends upon the intensity in the 
environmental changes according to the mechanism indicated in Hypotheses 1 and 2. It is 
interesting to note that with the presence of a stable regulatory body (see Figure 2, Panel 
a.), at very low levels of focal activity the simple slope between adaptation experience 
and performance is positive whereas it is increasingly negative as focal activity becomes 
larger. Conversely, when technical regulations change is intense the opposite holds. In 
                                                
20 Figure 1 reports the actual ranges of observed values of the moderator Focal Activity to show that the regions of 
significance do include those values. 
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fact, the sign of the simple slope between adaptation experience and performance is 
negative at lower values of focal activity and positive when the latter are higher.  
 
Insert Table 4.2, Figure 4.2 and Table 4.3 About Here 
 
4.3 Alternative Explanations 
The results reported in the prior section indicate support for the hypothesis that the 
level of change occurring in the technical regulations plays a major moderating role in 
defining the most successful adaptation systems. However, one can question whether 
external shocks in this industry are in fact purely exogenous, thus raising doubts of 
possible alternative reasons that may explain some firms’ performance variations. More 
precisely, one may conjecture that the nature of the changes in the technical regulations 
may favor certain companies and displace others for reasons that have no association 
with their focal activity. In this section, some possible alternative explanations are 
anticipated and examined using the qualitative and quantitative dataset.  
 A first broad alternative explanation is that the changes in the technical 
regulations may have contrasting effects on each organization. In other words, one could 
image that the technical rules may define a zero sum game with two possible states — in 
state s1, team A benefits and team B suffers, and vice versa in state s2. However, the 
qualitative data coded during this work show little evidence in support of this argument. 
Consider the possible areas of the car to which the technical regulations may apply: the 
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aerodynamics, the overall design, the engine, the mechanical parts, the electronics and the 
tires.  
The aerodynamic design refers to the parts of the car that generates the 
“downforce,” that is, the force that pushes the car down onto the track. This aspect is 
crucial when the car needs to follow a non-linear direction. The downforce prevents the 
car that is turning from spinning or losing speed. The overall design of the car refers to all 
the other specifics that cannot be classified as aerodynamic. For example, the chassis of 
the car is subject to regulations in terms of minimal weight required. The mechanical 
parts refer to all the elements that contribute to transforming the energy generated by the 
engine in motion — for example, the transmission, the gearbox and the braking system. 
Not all components of a F1 car are mechanical. A wide variety of technologies are based 
on sophisticated electronic devices that help the car (and the pilot) to control the 
processes that create motion. One example of sophisticated electronic technology is the 
launch control, which improves the ability of the car to react efficiently at the grid.  
Table 4 reports the detailed account of the main changes in technical regulations 
between 2001 and 2009. The data show that the subset of areas to which the regulations 
apply is extremely variable in its composition and magnitude over time. Because of the 
complex nature of the F1 cars, any subsequent technical change that affects a different set 
of components of a following model will generate unique interdependent effects on the 
other cars’ components’ optimal set-up (Levinthal & Warglien, 1999; Rivkin & 
Siggelkow, 2003). These peculiar characteristics falsify the hypothesis of the existence of 
simple dichotomous states in the expected effects of each wave of technical rules. The 
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most plausible scenario emerging from the observed phenomenon is that the subsequent 
waves of technical regulations generate a sequence of rather uncorrelated states  – s1, s2, 
…, sn – in which each organization will define a highly idiosyncratic evolutionary path. 
To put it simply, although it may happen that at time 1 the regulator introduces rule A 
and then at time 5 reverses it, as a result of the multifaceted nature of the technical 
changes and the complex nature of F1 cars’ prototypes, the characteristics of the world at 
time 1, s1, will largely differ from those at time 5, s5, with respect to each different team. 
 
Insert Table 4.4 About Here 
 
 Although this section has shown that the nature of the changes in the technical 
regulations in combination with the characteristics of the F1 cars fails to produce 
straightforward effects on each team in each following wave of change, the regulatory 
authority may in fact purposefully aim to alter the status quo for the sake of a 
superordinate interest. More specifically, the technical regulations might be designed to 
either favor or penalize a specific subset of teams. The data show that the FIA mainly 
defined the regulations in pursuit of four ultimate goals: 1) increased safety; 2) increased 
entertainment; 3) reduced costs; and 4) increased revenues.  
 The first goal obviously refers to the adoption of the most advanced procedures 
and innovations to increase the pilots’ safety. The history of F1 is sadly characterized by 
many fatal accidents that shocked the community of fans and practitioners.  
 
 
 87 
The remaining goals are all related to economic issues. Specifically, the FIA 
strives to increase the number of overtakes during the races (instances in which a leader 
in the race is overtaken by another vehicle). Overtaking stimulates the audience’s interest 
and increases the race’s entertainment value. Moreover, it is in the interest of the FIA to 
keep the costs of the teams under control in order to increase competition. Finally, the 
regulator occasionally imposes specific physical modifications in the cars to enlarge the 
spaces dedicated to sponsorships with the goal of increasing revenues.  The data reported 
in Table 5, which indicate the reasons behind each regulatory change, reveal a quite 
heterogeneous mix of rationales associated with the technical changes that occurred 
between 2001 and 2009. Although it is plausible to argue that the impact of the safety 
regulations and those oriented to maximize the sponsorships are substantially neutral 
across teams, the subset of technical regulations specifically designed to avoid situations 
where one company displays a robust and continuous leadership deserves special 
attention. These regulations may theoretically be designed to disrupt the advantages of 
one or more F1 companies in order to increase entertainment value.  
To explore this issue, in Figure 3 the following indexes are plotted. The solid line 
represents the magnitude index of the technical changes, previously adopted as a 
regressor, whereas the dashed line refers to a concentration index of the organizations’ 
performance, computed as follows. First, a normalized relative percentage ratio between 
each annual value of the index and the highest value of the index in the sampling period 
(1982-2010) was computed, thus obtaining a zero-one indicator. Then, an index of 
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concentration of the teams’ performance was calculated by adopting the following 
normalized concentration ratio C, for each season, t, included in the sample: 
, 
where xit indicates the performance of each ith organization in season t, Xt  is the sum of 
the annual performance of all the organizations in season t and Nt is the number of 
organizations in season t. Finally, the annual values of Ct were normalized by computing 
the ratios with the highest value of the index in the denominator. This comparison should 
help interpret the evolution of the technical regulations with respect to the general 
purpose of increasing the entertainment value of the sport by indirectly reducing the 
concentration of the performance distribution of the racing teams.  
 
Insert Figure 4.3 About Here 
 
The trends reported in Figure 3 suggest no systematic association between level of 
concentration in the teams’ performance distribution and the magnitude of the external 
shocks. Nonetheless, a triangulation of this information with the qualitative data 
generated a more precise analysis of the more consistent shocks, which occurred in 1983, 
1994, 1998, 2004 and 2009. The shock in 1983 was articulated with the purpose of 
defining the “rules of the game” of the modern F1 sport. Clearly, in this case there was no 
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specific intent to favor or penalize any subset of teams, as they had all started developing 
brand new capabilities within a short period of time21 and no leading team was 
dominating the scene. As shown in Figure 3, the shocks that happened around 1994, 1998 
and 2004 were not preceded by periods of intense concentration in the sportive 
performance (although the concentration in the performance started increasing after 
2000), and were mainly reacting to a few tragic fatal accidents in the mid-nineties by 
increasing safety.  
On the other hand, the shock of 2009 may be classified as one that was 
purposefully intended to break a rapidly increasing concentration in the teams’ 
performance, as shown in Figure 3. The content of this technical rule change, reported in 
detail in Table 4, which the experts judged as the most radical since 1983, mainly 
referred to the ban of some crucial aerodynamics parts of the car that constituted an 
important advantage for the teams that dominated the scene. Regardless of the actual 
effects that they generated for the leading teams, the presence of these changes fails to 
alter the validity of the empirical results, as they influence only one wave of observations 
in the set of repeated measures. In other words, they may only possibly generate spurious 
results with respect to the data collected in 2009. To check for the robustness of the 
results to this exclusion, the analysis was repeated by excluding the year 2009, obtaining 
no relevant variations in the findings for both the estimates of the coefficients and their 
statistical significance.  
                                                
21 From 1981 on, the racing teams began developing their chassis in-house. 
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 In sum, in this section the nature of the changes in the technical regulations in F1 
from 1982 to 2010 were investigated to show that although they may in at least one case 
be driven by goals that unequally penalize the racing teams, this consideration fails to 
substantially constitute a plausible alternative explanation for the study’s empirical 
findings.
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4.4 Figures 
 
Figure 4.1 Alternative Characteristics of a Changing Organization at a Specific 
Point in Time Given Different Levels of Adaptation Experience and Focal Activity 
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Figure 4.2 Three-Way Interaction Effect among Adaptation Experience, Focal 
Activity and Magnitude of Change in the Technical Regulations 
 
 
NOTE: In each figure the y-axis indicates the simple slopes of the relationships between Adaptation 
Experience and Performance, whereas the x-axis refers to the level of the variable Focal Activity. Each 
graph reports the estimation lines, the 95% confidence bands within the range of the values of the 
moderator Focal Activity observed in the dataset (between 0 ad 2). Panels a and b refer to representative 
low and high values of the moderator Magnitude of Change in the Technical Regulations, respectively. 
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Figure 4.3 Comparison between Aggregate Concentration in the Formula 1 
Teams’ Performance and the Magnitude of  Changes in Technical Regulations 
between 1982 and 2010 
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4.5 Tables 
 
Table 4.1 Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
 
  
Variable Mean s.d. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. Performance 0.02 0.36 1       
2. Change Drivers 1.00 0.67 -0.17 1      
3. Change Engineers 0.62 0.73 -0.12 0.09 1     
4. Supplemental Development 0.77 0.43 0.07 -0.17 0.07 1    
5. Adaptation Experience (AE) 5.84 2.56 0.06 -0.09 -0.07 0.17 1   
6.  Focal Activity (FA) 0.52 0.44 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.24 1  
7.  Change in the Technical 
Regulations 0.62 0.46 -0.07 0.04 -0.01 -0.07 0.13 0.68 1 
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Table 4.2 Results of Two-Way System GMM Models Estimation 
N =293; standard errors in parentheses;  † p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.019** 
(0.007) 
0.043† 
(0.025) 
0.062 
(0.073) 
0.466* 
(0.233) 
Performancet-1 0.459
* 
(0.228) 
0.361 
(0.301) 
1.41† 
(0.86) 
23.29* 
(10.31) 
Supplemental Development 0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
0.051 
(0.063) 
0.543* 
(0.245) 
Change Drivers 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
-0.025 
(0.015) 
Change Engineers 0.006
* 
(0.002) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.056) 
0.020* 
(0.009) 
Adaptation Experience  -0.003 (0.002) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
0.179* 
(0.084) 
Focal Activity  0.004 (0.011) 
0.347 
(0.298) 
3.921* 
(1.772) 
Adaptation Experience × Focal 
Activity   
-0.004 
(0.006) 
-0.681* 
(0.306) 
Adaptation Experience ×  Change in 
the Technical Regulations   
-0.015 
(0.010) 
-0.293* 
(0.138) 
Focal Activity  × Change in the 
Technical Regulations   
-0.364 
(0.290) 
-4.06* 
(1.843) 
Adaptation Experience × Focal 
Activity × Change in the Technical 
Regulations 
   0.722
* 
(0.327) 
Firm Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Wald (χ2) 18,397*** 4,009.84*** 5,416.64*** 8,707.58*** 
# Instruments 36 45 54 48 
AR(1) -2.37* -1.39 -1.28 -0.59 
AR(2) 0.73 -1.16 -1.02 -0.51 
Sargan 2.19 12.75 9.53 4.60 
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Table 4.3 Simple Slopes of Adaptation Experience on Product Performance at 
Various Levels of Focal Activity and Magnitude of Change in the Technical 
Regulations 
 
 r           0                         0.25                                 0.5               1                                1.5             1.75                         2 
 
0 0.18* 0.01 -0.16* -0.5* -0.84* -1.01* -1.18* 
0.25 0.11* -0.02 -0.14* -0.39* -0.65* -0.77* -0.9* 
0.5 0.03 -0.05 -0.13* -0.29* -0.45* -0.53* -0.61* 
1 -0.11 -0.1* -0.09* -0.07* -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
1.5 -0.26* -0.16* -0.06 0.14* 0.34* 0.44* 0.54* 
1.75 -0.34* -0.19* -0.04 0.25* 0.54* 0.69* 0.83* 
2 -0.41* -0.22* -0.03 0.36* 0.74* 0.93* 1.12* 
 
NOTE: The table reports the simple slopes between Performance and Adaptation Experience at various 
combinations of levels of the moderators Focal Activity (Columns) and Magnitude of Change in the Technical 
Regulations (Rows). A star next to the reported values indicates that the simple slope is statistically significant 
at 95%. 
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Table 4.4 Detailed Account of the Main Changes in Technical Regulations 
Between 2001 and 2009 
 
 Type of Change 
Area of 
Change Expected Consequences Reason 
2001:     
50mm increase in front 
wing height Major Aerodynamics 
Reduction of the downforce – 
reduction of the car’s speed 
 
Increase entertainment 
(more overtaking) – 
Increase safety 
New safety tests on 
chassis and new side 
intrusion requirement 
Major Mechanical 
Increases in the cars’ weight in 
some unwanted places and 
increase in the height of the 
centre of gravity – reduction of 
the car’s performance 
Increase safety 
Reintroduction of the 
traction control to the F1 
grid 
Major Electronic 
Increase the control over the 
link between the driver’s foot 
and the engine throttle to 
prevent any reduced-load tires 
from spinning 
Increase equity across 
constructors 
2002:     
High visibility rain light 
increased in size by 50% Incremental Design Increase visibility Increase safety 
50% wider wing mirrors Incremental Design Increase control Increase safety 
2003:     
Ban on traction and 
launch control Major Electronic 
Ban of the electronic devices 
introduced in 2001 
Cost reduction and 
increase entertainment 
2004:     
Rear wing can only use 
two upper elements, and 
endplates are now 10cm 
longer 
Incremental Aerodynamics Increase wing’s efficiency 
Increase revenues from 
sponsors (increase 
space on the cars to 
introduce sponsorship) 
Engine covers are now 
mandated to extend to a 
specific height and width 
ahead of the rear axle 
Incremental Design 
Little loss in flow to the rear 
wing and some negative 
effects when the car slides 
Increase revenues from 
sponsors (increase 
space on the cars to 
introduce sponsorship) 
No automated gearshifts 
and launch control Incremental Electronic 
More responsibility for the 
pilots to control the car Increase entertainment 
One engine per driver per 
weekend Major Engine 
Increase of the engine’s 
reliability and consequent 
reduction of engine’s power – 
reduction of the car’s speed 
Cost reduction – 
Increase entertainment 
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(Continued) Type of Change 
Area of 
Change Expected Consequences Reason 
2005:     
Raise of the front wing, 
lower the diffuse tunnel 
height and move the rear 
wing forward 
Incremental Aerodynamics Reduction of 25% of the downforce – speed reduction 
Increase 
entertainment 
value 
2006:     
New engines. From V10 
to V8 of 2.4 liters Major Engine 
Power loss and reduced fuel 
consumption and cooling 
Increase 
entertainment 
value – Cost 
reduction 
2007:     
Rear impact structure Incremental Mechanical Increase the strength of the structure Increase safety 
Addition of slot gap 
spacers to the rear wing Incremental Aerodynamics 
Slight reduction of the downforce 
and of the car’s speed 
Increase 
entertainment 
value 
2008:     
Introduction of a single 
engine electronic control 
system 
Major Electronic 
Reduction of the electronic controls 
in F1 through the adoption of a 
single standardized electronic 
system. Alters the car’s power 
delivery 
Increase 
entertainment 
value – Cost 
reduction 
Gearbox life regulation 
(four race weekend) Major Mechanical 
Increases the need for more reliable 
gearboxes 
Increase 
entertainment 
value – Cost 
reduction 
Specification of 
dimensions and weights 
of the gearbox 
Incremental Mechanical Standardization of the gearbox’s dimensions 
Increase 
entertainment 
value – Cost 
reduction 
2009:     
Introduction of KERS 
(Kinetic Energy 
Recovery Systems) 
Major Mechanical 
Generation of supplemental energy 
for the braking system to be used to 
increase performance when needed 
Increase 
entertainment 
value 
Removal of all the 
aerodynamic add-ons Major Aerodynamics Reduction of the downforce 
Increase 
entertainment 
value 
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5 CONCLUSION 
This section concludes by summarizing the main results of the three chapters and 
discussing the main contributions. The image of organizations as being driven by 
relatively stable routine-driven behavior and being the subject of competitive selection 
pressure at the population level is a theoretically and empirically powerful perspective.  
However, it is important to extend our evolutionary models at the organizational level in 
at least two dimensions.  One is to incorporate the fact that considerable heterogeneity is 
typically present within an individual organization regarding organizational practices.  In 
addition, it is critical in an evolutionary account to distinguish between the genetic 
encoding associated with a given practice and the expression of that practice in a given 
context.  In at least a stylized manner, Essay 1 has introduced both these elements.   
Organizational performance in a direct sense is a function of the realized behaviors 
in which the organization engages.  What we termed as phenotypic plasticity has the 
virtue of allowing for a greater range of action. However, we observe that these dynamic 
organizations display reduced effectiveness in selecting their underlying genotypes. As a 
result, such organizations rely on an inferior set of standard practices. Thus, the basis of 
superior performance entails a tension between plasticity’s positive rule in offering near-
term flexibility in action and its long-term consequences for the quality of the underlying 
genetic basis of organizational practices. In a stable environment, the net effect of these 
forces is to favor intra organizational evolutionary dynamics in which the individual 
behavior patterns are relatively inert, but there is fairly intense differential selection 
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among them.  In dynamic environments, the tradeoff between the flexibility benefits of 
plasticity and its negative implications for the quality of the genetic basis of behavior 
shifts, with some degree of plasticity being valued; however, the ideal level of plasticity 
appears to be relatively modest.   
The question of what constitutes the characteristics of an adaptive organization is 
quite naturally a central issue for management theorists who strive to understand the 
possibilities and pathologies of organizational change. In particular, the issue of the 
plasticity of organizations has surfaced in recent years within the strategy literature in the 
context of discussions of dynamic capabilities (Teece et al., 1997), stable properties of 
organizations that facilitate efforts at effective change, as distinct from firm differences in 
capabilities associated with current performance. Our findings show that plasticity for 
adaptation may not be evolutionary beneficial under specific conditions and, in particular, 
that plasticity reduces the selectability of the underlying, stable traits of the organization.  
In addition, the analysis points to the fact that in our interest as a field in considering the 
adaptive benefits of phenotypic plasticity, we have tended to neglect the role that 
genotypic diversity plays in fostering robustness.  The mechanisms of variation-selection-
retention put forward by Campbell (1965) do not rely on the adaptability of a particular 
component of organizational behavior but rather a basic Darwian process of differential 
selection.  Mechanisms that support an ongoing level of internal variation, such as 
turnover, slack, and local experimentation, facilitate organizational adaptation in a 
manner quite distinct from the plasticity. It is important to recognize the role of variation 
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in fostering overall organizational adaptation and the ways in which plasticity of lower-
level elements may work against sustaining this diversity.    
More generally, it is important to recognize that organizational adaptation is a 
collective property.  As such, the implication of the adaptability of any particular facet of 
organizational behavior is, in general, ambiguous with respect to the adaptiveness of the 
collective. In this sense, to understand organizational evolution, one should keep the 
focus on the interrelated attributes of the (possibly) dynamic organization rather than on 
some specific subset of capabilities.  Organizations are complex systems.  Their 
robustness and adaptability is a function of the interplay of multiple factors guiding their 
evolutionary dynamics.  Beyond the particular results or the model and analysis, the hope 
is that Essay 1 serves to highlight the importance of engaging the rich internal ecology of 
organizational evolution and to provide a useful conceptual framework for examining 
these issues.   
To date, it is still an open theoretical question as to how organizational routines 
evolve under the pressure of institutional forces. In Essay 2, we focused on two 
alternative types of forces and investigated through a grounded theory approach the 
emergent dynamic mechanisms in a medium-sized firm. Specifically, we studied the 
impact of IT systems and quality certification on the ecology of internal routines that the 
firm developed since its origins. These two forces were purposefully selected to 
distinguish between initiatives that were primarily driven by direct economic reasons, 
such as to increase efficiency and productivity by introducing IT systems, and by reasons 
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mainly linked with the gain of legitimacy within the organizational field, as for the case 
of quality certifications.   
 IT systems and quality certifications indeed altered the existing behavior in a very 
distinct fashion depending on the nature of the routines subject to change when the forces 
started operating. Specifically, IT systems rapidly and pervasively diffused within the 
web of existing behaviors. The procedures defined by the software and the rules 
developed in-house engaged a process of reciprocal revision that ended up in a successful 
adaptation. On the other hand, the prescriptions defined by the quality manuals had an 
opposing impact on the operating routines and on the security and safety procedures. 
Regarding the former, the organization showed a marked skepticism and a substantial 
indifference with respect to the rules. Nonetheless, the workers produced a dedicated 
extra effort to both successfully complying with the rules on the surface and, at the same 
time, to substantially retain the existing habits, which were considered as superior 
practices. However, as per the security and safety procedures, the organization showed 
strong flexibility by substantially altering the existing procedure to comply with the 
quality manuals. In other words, while the organizational actors were strongly motivated 
to redesign the security and safety procedures according to the prescriptions of the quality 
manuals, they showed a marked reluctance and skepticism toward altering the existing 
operational procedures that referred to core processes such as production, marketing or 
sales. Moreover, not only did the organizational actors show marked proclivity to retain 
the existing operating procedures, but they also learned the rules contained in the manual 
and developed a compliant behavior only for the purpose of obtaining the certificate. 
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 Our finding suggest the existence of a relationship between the goal underlying 
the external forces that the organization experiences and the adaptive mechanism 
thorough which existing routines interplay with the dynamic pressures. Specifically, 
when the force is generated mainly for technical reasons – the non-institutional type – 
dynamic adaptation with existing practices is likely to occur. Conversely, if the 
legitimacy goal prevails the organization operates a selection either strongly in favor or 
against a substantial adoption of the practice.  
Finally, in Essay 3 I investigate the evolution of a population of organizations 
from the initial development of the industry to the present day. The main goal was to 
study whether and under which environmental conditions product dynamic capabilities 
lead to superior firm performance. The findings complement and extend prior literature 
on adaptation experience and dynamic capabilities (Danneels, 2008; Eggers, 2012; King 
& Tucci, 2002) by showing that prior experience in product adaptation is predictive of 
higher firm performance only under specific circumstances. In fact, interaction analysis 
reveals that the level of focal activity and the intensity of the environmental change 
significantly moderate this relationship.  
The data show that when the change in the environment is intense, the level of 
focal activity positively moderates the effectiveness of prior product adaptation 
experience. On the other hand, when the environment is stable, the sign of this 
moderation becomes negative. More precisely, in this data, the analysis suggests that 
product dynamic capabilities based on greater adaptation experience are associated with 
superior firm performance, all other things being equal, either when the environment 
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requires an intense change and focal activity is present or when the environment is stable 
and focal activity is absent. Interestingly, in the remaining circumstances the role of 
adaptation experience is found to be detrimental. This suggests that the contextual levels 
of environmental dynamism and focal activity may turn the advantages of experienced 
dynamic capabilities into costs.  
These findings offer important contributions to the literature on dynamic 
capabilities as they help clarify when dynamic capabilities based on general long-
standing experience may effectively produce beneficial effects for an organization – an 
open issue in the current literature. The analysis suggests that the development of 
capabilities that drive more effective product reconfigurations is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient element to boost performance. Specifically, the results show that possessing 
dynamic capabilities based on a long-standing adaptation experience is not an 
unambiguous advantage. In fact, if these capabilities are recently maintained and the 
necessary variety is generated within the organization, prior experience efficiently drives 
relevant adaptation efforts. Conversely, if recent focal activity is absent, then adaptation 
experience may lead to misleading adaptive processes and thereby produce a negative 
impact on firm performance (Haas & Hansen, 2004). On the other hand, if the required 
adaptation effort is minimal, focal activity is hurtful as it activates adaptive processes that 
are distracting and not central for the task environment. Interestingly, adaptation 
experience is found to have positive effects on performance when changes in the 
environment are incremental and focal activity is absent. This finding supports the 
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suggestion proposed by Helfat and Winter (2011) that dynamic capabilities are indeed 
useful even to handle settings with limited environmental dynamism. 
Moreover, Essay 3 offers a reconciliation on the contrasting views among the 
foundational contributions on dynamic capabilities, which on the one hand acknowledge 
the existence of commonalities in dynamic capabilities across firms, as originally argued 
by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), and on the other hand the possibility of an impact of 
dynamic capabilities on competitive advantage, as suggested by Teece et al. (1997) and 
Makadok (2001). In fact, this study finds that contingent factors such as the level of focal 
activity and the concurrent environmental dynamics play a major moderating role, 
according to a mechanism that, in this dataset, is common across organizations. At the 
same time, prior experience in adaptation represents a central firm-specific source of 
capability development that organizations cumulate and use in distinct ways to undertake 
adapting efforts. 
One broader implication related to the analysis of an organization’s focal activity 
as a possible moderator for successful adaptation is that it points to the importance of 
studying the organization at specific points in time as opposed to attempting to isolate 
long-standing and enduring capabilities or attributes of the organization.  Focal activity is 
a contextual property of the organization. An organization may display different levels of 
focal activity at different points in time. Therefore, all other things being equal, the 
expected results of an adaptation effort of the same organization may vary across two 
distinct moments of its evolution. Focusing on specific organizational change processes 
in isolation, such as processes of internationalization, corporate acquisitions, or product 
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development, risks confounding their relevant effects on performance by overlooking 
important contextual moderating variables, which may have both organization specific 
and time varying qualities.  
Essay 3 has limitations in that it investigates a general form of adaptation 
experience while other more specific types of experience may produce different effects. 
However, since more specific forms of experience may, in turn, be subject to effects that 
are contingent to specific circumstances, focusing on general adaptation experience 
allows for the isolation of adaptive processes that are at the base of an enduring and 
universal capacity to address changing environments – a central issue at the base of the 
concept of dynamic capabilities. Moreover, this empirical setting has limitations in that it 
refers only to a single industry, which may reduce the generalizability of the results; 
however, the setting has unique characteristics that make it particularly suitable to 
capturing the underlying phenomenon.  
Evolution in complex organizations is the product of multiple contingencies; 
highlighting one facet in isolation of others has other important inherent limitations. 
Robust empirical evidence suggests the important moderating role of focal activity and 
environmental dynamism in influencing the impact of prior experience in product 
adaptation and in this way the work points to a more contextualized understanding of the 
role of dynamic capabilities and adaptation. 
 Indeed, organizational dynamicity includes a complex set of interrelated 
mechanisms, adopting multiple methodological and conceptual approaches is thus 
imperative to make progress in the understanding of the whole phenomenon. Together, 
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the three essays of this dissertation point to this direction by relying on different methods 
and complementary perspectives.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
6 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Ahuja, G., & Katila, R. 2001. Technological acquisitions and the innovation performance 
of acquiring firms: A longitudinal study. Strategic Management Journal, 22(3): 
197-220. 
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. 1991. Multiple Regression: Testing and Interpreting 
Interactions. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Inc. 
Aldrich, H. 1999. Organizations evolving. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd. 
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equations. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 58(2): 277-297. 
Arellano, M., & Bover, O. 1995. Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of 
error-components models. Journal of econometrics, 68(1): 29-51. 
Argote, L. 1999. Organizational learning: Creating, retaining, and transferring 
knowledge: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Argote, L., & Epple, D. 1990. Learning curves in manufacturing. Science, 247(4945): 
920. 
Argyris, C. 1982. Reasoning, learning, and action: Individual and organizational: 
Jossey-Bass San Francisco. 
Baldwin, J. 1896. A new factor in evolution. The american naturalist, 30(354): 441-451. 
Baltagi, B. H. 2005. Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
 
 
 109 
Barney, J. 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of 
management, 17(1): 99-120. 
Barreto, I. 2010. Dynamic capabilities: A review of past research and an agenda for the 
future. Journal of Management, 36(1): 256-280. 
Bauer, D. J., & Curran, P. J. 2005. Probing interactions in fixed and multilevel 
regression: Inferential and graphical techniques. Multivariate Behavioral 
Research, 40(3): 373. 
Baum, J. A. C., & Campbell, D. T. 1999. Variations in organization science: Sage Publ. 
Baum, J. A. C., & Ingram, P. 1998. Survival-enhancing learning in the Manhattan hotel 
industry, 1898-1980. Management Science: 996-1016. 
Baum, J. A. C., & Singh, J. V. 1994. Evolutionary dynamics of organizations: Oxford 
University Press, USA. 
Bharadwaj, A. S. 2000. A resource-based perspective on information technology 
capability and firm performance: an empirical investigation. MIS quarterly: 169-
196. 
Birnholtz, J., Cohen, M., & Hoch, S. 2007. Organizational character: On the regeneration 
of camp poplar grove. Organization Science, 18(2): 315. 
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic 
panel data models. Journal of econometrics, 87(1): 115-143. 
Bruderer, E., & Singh, J. 1996. Organizational evolution, learning, and selection: A 
genetic-algorithm-based model. The Academy of Management Journal, 39(5): 
1322-1349. 
 
 
 110 
Brusoni, S., Prencipe, A., & Pavitt, K. 2001. Knowledge specialization, organizational 
coupling, and the boundaries of the firm: Why do firms know more than they 
make? Administrative science quarterly, 46(4): 597-621. 
Burgelman, R. 1991. Intraorganizational ecology of strategy making and organizational 
adaptation: Theory and field research. Organization Science, 2(3): 239-262. 
Burgelman, R. 1994. Fading Memories: A Process Theory of Strategic Business Exit in 
Dynamic Environments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(1). 
Burns, T., & Stalker, G. M. 1961. The Management of Innovation: Tavistock 
Publications, Ltd. 
Campbell, D. T. 1960. Blind Variation and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in 
Other Knowledge Processes. Psychological Review, 67: 380-400. 
Campbell, D. T. 1965. Variation and Selective Retention in Socio-Cultural Evolution. In 
H. R. Barringer, G. I. Blankstein, & R. W. Mack (Eds.), Social Change in 
Developing Areas: A Reinterpretation of Evolutionary Theory. Cambridge, MA: 
Schenkman. 
Campbell, D. T. 1982. Evolutionary Epistemology. In H. C. Plotkin (Ed.), Learning, 
Development, and Culture: Essays in Evolutionary E. Chichester: UK: Open 
Court Publisher. 
Carroll, G., & Harrison, J. 1993. Evolution among competing organizational forms. 
World Futures, 37: 91-110. 
 
 
 111 
Cattani, G. 2005. Preadaptation, firm heterogeneity, and technological performance: A 
study on the evolution of fiber optics, 1970-1995. Organization Science: 563-
580. 
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. 2003. Applied multiple 
correlation/regression analysis for the social sciences: Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Cohen, M., March, J., & Olsen, J. 1972. A garbage can model of organizational choice. 
Administrative science quarterly, 17(1): 1-25. 
Collis, D. J. 1994. How valuable are dynamic capabilities? Strategic Management 
Journal, 15: 143-151. 
Cyert, R., & March, J. G. 1963. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice Hall. 
Danneels, E. 2002. The dynamics of product innovation and firm competences. Strategic 
management journal, 23(12): 1095-1121. 
Danneels, E. 2008. Organizational antecedents of second-order competences. Strategic 
Management Journal, 29(5): 519-543. 
Davis, J., Eisenhardt, K., & Bingham, C. 2007. Developing theory through simulation 
methods. Academy of Management Review, 32(2): 480. 
Davis, J. P., Eisenhardt, K. M., & Bingham, C. B. 2009. Optimal Structure, Market 
Dynamism, and the Strategy of Simple Rules. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
54: 413-452. 
 
 
 112 
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. 1983. The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and 
collective rationality in organizational fields. American sociological review, 
48(2): 147-160. 
Dobbin, F. 2009. Inventing equal opportunity: Princeton University Press. 
Dobbin, F. R. 1992. The origins of private social insurance: Public policy and fringe 
benefits in America, 1920-1950. American Journal of Sociology: 1416-1450. 
Dosi, G., & Marengo, L. 2000. Some elements of an evolutionary theory of 
organizational competences. The Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives on 
Business and Management, 4: 50. 
Dosi, G., Nelson, R., & Winter, S. 2000. The Nature and Dynamics of Organizational 
Capabilities: Oxford University Press. 
Dougherty, D. 2002. Building Grounded Theory: Some Principles and Practices. 
Companion to Organizations: 849-867. 
Drnevich, P. L., & Kriauciunas, A. P. 2011. Clarifying the conditions and limits of the 
contributions of ordinary and dynamic capabilities to relative firm performance. 
Strategic Management Journal, 32(3): 254-279. 
Edelman, L. B. 1990. Legal environments and organizational governance: The expansion 
of due process in the American workplace. American Journal of Sociology: 
1401-1440. 
Eggers, J. P. 2012. All experience is not created equal: learning, adapting, and focusing in 
product portfolio management. Strategic Management Journal, 33(3): 315-335. 
 
 
 113 
Eisenhardt, K., & Martin, J. 2000. Dynamic capabilities: what are they? Strategic 
management journal: 1105-1121. 
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. 2007. Theory building from cases: Opportunities 
and challenges. Academy of management journal, 50(1): 25-32. 
Ethiraj, S., & Levinthal, D. 2004. Hoping for A to Z While Rewarding Only A: Complex 
Organizations and Multiple Goals. Organization Science, 20(1): 4-21. 
Feldman, M. 2000. Organizational routines as a source of continuous change. 
Organization Science: 611-629. 
Fleming, L. 2001. Recombinant uncertainty in technological search. Management 
science: 117-132. 
Freeman, J. 1975. The Unit Problem in Organizational Research, Annual Meeting of the 
American Sociological Association. San Francisco. 
Galunic, C., & Rodan, S. 1998. Resource recombinations in the firm: knowledge 
structures and the potential for Schumpeterian innovation. Strategic management 
journal, 19(12): 1193-1201. 
Gioia, D. A., Corley, K. G., & Hamilton, A. L. 2012. Seeking Qualitative Rigor in 
Inductive Research: Notes on the Gioia Methodology. Organizational Research 
Methods. 
Glaser, B. G. 2008. Conceptualization: On theory and theorizing using grounded theory. 
International Journal of Qualitative Methods, 1(2): 23-38. 
 
 
 114 
Haas, M. R., & Hansen, M. T. 2004. When using knowledge can hurt performance: The 
value of organizational capabilities in a management consulting company. 
Strategic Management Journal, 26(1): 1-24. 
Hansen, M., & Haas, M. 2001. Competing for attention in knowledge markets: Electronic 
document dissemination in a management consulting company. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 46(1): 1-28. 
Hargadon, A., & Sutton, R. I. 1997. Technology brokering and innovation in a product 
development firm. Administrative Science Quarterly: 716-749. 
Hedberg, B. L. T., Bystrom, P. C., & Starbuck, W. H. 1976. Camping on seesaws: 
Prescriptions for a self-designing organization. Administrative Science Quarterly: 
41-65. 
Helfat, C., Finkelstein, S., Mitchell, W., Peteraf, M., Singh, H., Teece, D., & Winter, S. 
2007. Dynamic capabilities: Blackwell Pub. 
Helfat, C. E., & Raubitschek, R. S. 2000. Product Sequencing: Co-evolution of 
Knowledge, Capabilities, and Products. Strategic Management Journal, 18(5): 
961-980. 
Helfat, C. E., & Winter, S. G. 2011. Untangling Dynamic and Operational Capabilities: 
Strategy for the (N)ever-Changing World. Strategic Management Journal, 32: 
1243–1250. 
Hinton, G. E., & Nowlan, S. J. 1987. How learning can guide evolution. Complex 
Systems, 1(3): 495-502. 
 
 
 115 
Holland, J. 1975. Adaptation in natural and artificial systems: Ann Arbor MI: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Huber, G. P. 1991. Organizational learning: The contributing processes and the 
literatures. Organization science, 2(1): 88-115. 
Iansiti, M., & Clark, K. B. 1994. Integration and dynamic capability: evidence from 
product development in automobiles and mainframe computers. Industrial and 
corporate change, 3(3): 557-605. 
Kale, P., & Singh, H. 2007. Building firm capabilities through learning: the role of the 
alliance learning process in alliance capability and firm-level alliance success. 
Strategic Management Journal, 28(10): 981-1000. 
Kalnins, A., & Mayer, K. J. 2004. Franchising, ownership, and experience: A study of 
pizza restaurant survival. Management Science, 50(12): 1716-1728. 
Karim, S., & Mitchell, W. 2000. Path Dependent and Path-Breaking Change: 
Reconfiguring Business Resources Following Acquisitions in the US Medical 
Sector, 1978-1995. Strategic Management Journal, 21(10/11). 
Kauffman, S. A. 1993. The Origins of Order: Self-organization and Selection in 
Evolution. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. 
Kennedy, M. T., & Fiss, P. C. 2009. Institutionalization, framing, and diffusion: The 
logic of TQM adoption and implementation decisions among US hospitals. 
Academy of Management Journal, 52(5): 897-918. 
 
 
 116 
King, A. A., & Tucci, C. L. 2002. Incumbent entry into new market niches: the role of 
experience and managerial choice in the creation of dynamic capabilities. 
Management Science: 171-186. 
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. 1993. Knowledge of the firm and the evolutionary theory of the 
multinational enterprise. Journal of International Business Studies, 24(4): 625-
645. 
Kraatz, M. S., & Zajac, E. J. 2001. How organizational resources affect strategic change 
and performance in turbulent environments: theory and evidence. Organization 
Science, 12(5): 632-657. 
Lant, T. K., & Mezias, S. J. 1992. An organizational learning model of convergence and 
reorientation. Organization science, 3(1): 47-71. 
Lave, C. A., & March, J. G. 1975. An introduction to models in the social sciences. New 
York: Harper & Row. 
Lenox, M. J., Rockart, S. F., & Lewin, A. Y. 2010. Does interdependency affect firm and 
industry profitability? An empirical test. Strategic Management Journal, 31(2): 
121-139. 
Levinthal, D. 1997. Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes. Management science, 43(7): 
934-950. 
Levinthal, D., & Warglien, M. 1999. Landscape design: Designing for local action in 
complex worlds. Organization Science: 342-357. 
Levitt, B., & March, J. 1988. Organizational learning. Annual review of sociology, 14(1): 
319-338. 
 
 
 117 
Lounsbury, M. 2001. Institutional sources of practice variation: Staffing college and 
university recycling programs. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46(1): 29-56. 
Makadok, R. 2001. Toward a synthesis of the resource-based and dynamic-capability 
views of rent creation. Strategic management journal, 22(5): 387-401. 
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. 1979. Ambiguity and choice in organizations: 
Universitetsforlaget. 
March, J. G., & Simon, H. A. 1958. Organizations. New York: Wiley. 
Mayley, G. 1996. Landscapes, learning costs, and genetic assimilation. Evolutionary 
Computation, 4(3): 213-234. 
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. 1977. Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as 
myth and ceremony. American journal of sociology: 340-363. 
Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S. G. 1982. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap. 
Newbert, S. L. 2007. Empirical research on the resource-based view of the firm: an 
assessment and suggestions for future research. Strategic Management Journal, 
28(2): 121-146. 
Nickell, S. 1981. Biases in dynamic models with fixed effects. Econometrica: Journal of 
the Econometric Society: 1417-1426. 
Ocasio, W. 1997. Towards an attention-based view of the firm. Strategic management 
journal, 18(1): 187-206. 
Oliver, C. 1991. Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of management 
review: 145-179. 
 
 
 118 
Orlikowski, W. 2001. A situated change perspective. Organizational improvisation: 185. 
Orlikowski, W. J. 2000. Managing use not technology: a view from the trenches. 
Mastering Information Management. London: Prentice-Hall. 
Pache, A. C., & Santos, F. 2010. When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of 
organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands. Academy of 
Management Review, 35(3): 455-476. 
Posen, H. E., & Levinthal, D. A. 2012. Chasing a moving target: Exploitation and 
exploration in dynamic environments. Management Science, 58(3): 587-601. 
Rerup, C., & Feldman, M. S. 2011. Routines as a source of change in organizational 
schemata: The role of trial-and-error learning. The Academy of Management 
Journal, 54(3): 577-610. 
Rivkin, J. W. 2001. Reproducing Knowledge: Replication Without Imitation at Moderate 
Complexity. Organization Science, 12(3): 274. 
Rivkin, J. W., & Siggelkow, N. 2003. Balancing Search and Stability: Interdependencies 
Among Elements of Organizational Design. Management Science, 49(3): 290-
311. 
Roodman, D. 2005. An Index of Donor Performance-Revised August 2005. Available at 
SSRN 984250. 
Ruef, M., & Scott, W. R. 1998. A multidimensional model of organizational legitimacy: 
Hospital survival in changing institutional environments. Administrative Science 
Quarterly: 877-904. 
 
 
 119 
Samuel, A. 1959. Some Studies in Machine Learning Using the Game of Checkers. IBM 
Journal of Research Development, 31: 211-229. 
Schilling, M. A., Vidal, P., Ployhart, R. E., & Marangoni, A. 2003. Learning by doing 
something else: Variation, relatedness, and the learning curve. Management 
Science: 39-56. 
Siggelkow, N. 2002. Evolution toward Fit. Administrative Science Quarterly, 47(1): 
125-159. 
Simon, H. A. 1947. Administrative Behavior. A Study of Decision-Making Processes in 
Administrative Organization. New York, NY: The Free Press, Macmillan. 
Simon, H. A. 1956. Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological 
Review, 63(2): 129-138. 
Smets, M., Morris, T., & Greenwood, R. 2012. From Practice to Field: A Multilevel 
Model of Practice-Driven Institutional Change. Academy of Management 
Journal, 55(4): 877-904. 
Sull, D. N. 1999. Why good companies go bad? Harvard Business Review, 77: 44-52. 
Suzuki, R., & Arita, T. 2007. The dynamic changes in roles of learning through the 
Baldwin effect. Artificial Life, 13(1): 31-43. 
Szulanski, G. 1996. Exploring internal stickiness: Impediments to the transfer of best 
practice within the firm. Strategic management journal, 17(WINTER): 27-43. 
Teece, D., & Pisano, G. 1994. The dynamic capabilities of firms: an introduction. 
Industrial and corporate change, 3(3): 537. 
 
 
 120 
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., & Shuen, A. M. Y. 1997. Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic 
Management. Strategic Management Journal, 18(7): 509-533. 
Thompson, J. 1967. Organizations in action. New York, NY, US: McGraw-Hill. 
Tolbert, P. S., & Zucker, L. G. 1983. Institutional sources of change in the formal 
structure of organizations: The diffusion of civil service reform, 1880-1935. 
Administrative science quarterly: 22-39. 
Warglien, M. 1995. Hierarchical selection and organizational adaptation. Industrial and 
Corporate Change, 4(1): 161. 
Weick, K. E. 1969. The social psychology of organizing. Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley Pub. Co. 
Wernerfelt, B. 1984. A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic management journal: 
171-180. 
Westphal, J. D., Gulati, R., & Shortell, S. M. 1997. Customization or conformity? An 
institutional and network perspective on the content and consequences of TQM 
adoption. Administrative Science Quarterly: 366-394. 
Wilson, E., & Bossert, W. 1971. A primer of population biology. Sunderland, MA: 
Sinauer Associates. 
Windmeijer, F. 2005. A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-
step GMM estimators. Journal of econometrics, 126(1): 25-51. 
Winter, S. G. 2003. Understanding dynamic capabilities. Strategic Management 
Journal, 24(10): 991-995. 
 
 
 121 
Zollo, M., & Winter, S. G. 2002. Deliberate learning and the evolution of dynamic 
capabilities. Organization science: 339-351. 
 
 
